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I. INTRODUCTION
While most Americans depend on cell phones
and the Internet, many Native American tribes
still lack access to adequate telecommunications
services.' The recent development of ultrawide-
band ("UWB") technology, which operates by
utilizing spectrum occupied by existing radio ser-
vices,2 could provide tribes with access to high-
speed, wireless telecommunications services. How-
ever, a fierce political struggle and technological
debate has culminated in a recent decision by the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") to limit use of UWB for outdoor
communications systems." Because this technol-
ogy might be a solution to the difficulties that
tribes have in modernizing their telecommunica-
tions infrastructures, tribal lawyers should explore
legal tools to enable deployment of UWB-based
communication systems on tribal lands. In addi-
tion to benefiting tribes, successful tribal UVVB us-
age could also pave the way for widespread use of
UWB. Indeed, some wireless crusaders have al-
ready begun to aid tribes by establishing wireless
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1 See, e.g., Dr. Linda Ann Riley et. al., Assessment of Technol-
ogy Infrastructure in Native Communities, at http://www.doc.
gov/eda/pdf/ATINC.pdf (1996) (prepared by the College of
Engineering at New Mexico State University for the Depart-
ment of Commerce) [hereinafter Riley).
2 See In re Revision of Part 15 of Commission's Rules Re-
garding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, First Report
and Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 7435, para. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Re-
infrastructures employing UWB technology in the
hope of creating public pressure for loosening
FCC UWB regulations. 4
This article provides a thorough analysis of the
legal options available to tribes in attempting to
obtain the legal right to use UWB-based commu-
nication systems. Part II describes the dire needs
of Native Americans in the telecommunications
arena and Part III explains how UWB technology
could provide a solution. Parts IV and V investi-
gate FCC policy regarding UWB technology and
tribal telecommunications services. Finally, Part
VI sets forth the legal strategies available to tribes
wishing to use UWB-based communication sys-
tems. Initially, tribes can seek a declaratory judg-
ment in court that: (1) tribal sovereignty bars FCC
regulation of tribal telecommunications services;
or (2) the FCC has a responsibility to exempt
tribes from UWB restrictions. Alternatively, tribes
can petition the FCC to waive their UWB regula-
tions. We demonstrate that litigation would be
time-consuming, costly and unlikely to succeed.
Thus, we conclude tribes should invest their re-
vision of Part 15 Rules]; Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 3857 (2003)
[hereinafter Part 15 FNPRM].
-5 Revision of Part 15 Rules, supra note 2, paras. 2, 5.
4 For example, Dewayne Hendricks is helping Turtle
Mountain Chippewa Reservation in North Dakota to install a
wireless network that may eventually violate FCC regulations.
In return for a state of the art network, the tribe is willing to
assert its sovereignty against the FCC by arguing that because
it is a sovereign, the FCC's Rules do not apply within their
sovereign territory. See Brent Hurtig, Broadband Cowboy,
WIRED, at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/lO.O1/
hendricks.htinl (an. 2002) [hereinafter Hurtig].
The sovereignty argument might win in court. It might
lose. The FCC might not take the bait. Congress might
intervene. Any of these outcomes would serve Hen-
dricks' larger purpose: to create public pressure that will
force the FCC to loosen its grip. "People on the outside
are going to feel like cavemen when they see the tribes
with these amazing systems," he says. "If the reservations
can have them, why can't everyone?"Id. at 1.
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sources in lobbying the FCC to waive their UWB
regulations.
II. THE TRIBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CRISIS
Although the late 1990s have witnessed an in-
creased use of telecommunications technologies5
on tribal lands, there are still many tribes that lack
adequate telecommunications services. A compre-
hensive study in 1999 resulted in the following
conclusions:
* Only 39% of rural households in Native
American communities have telephones com-
pared to 94% for non-Native rural communi-
ties;
* 44% of tribes have no local radio stations,
and for those tribes with radio stations, these
stations are rarely tribally owned;
* Of rural Native American households, only
22% have cable television, 9% have personal
computers, and of those, only 8% have In-
ternet access.6
A large number of tribes in the United States
have expressed interest in acquiring telecommu-
nications technology. 7 Despite high poverty rates
of almost 45% of the populace on many reserva-
tions,8 the Native American population is none-
5 We use the term "telecommunications" loosely to refer
to any wired or wireless communications system.
6 Riley, supra note 1.
7 James Casey et. al., Native Networking: Telecommunications
and Information Technology in Indian Country, 1, at http://www.
benton.org/library/Native (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter Casey].
Although there is substantial tribal interest in advanced tele-
communications, there is also some reluctance to embrace
new technologies. Some tribal members fear that technology,
modernization and connectivity will sacrifice cultural preser-
vation, identity and core values. Id.
8 U.S. Census Bureau, Population, Land Area, and Poverty
Data for American Indian and Alaska Native Areas, at http://
www.ntda.rockyboy.org/meml)ers/predocl 1.html (Apr. 4,
2000).
9 U.S. DEPARTMENT O' COMMERCE ET AL., DYNAMIC DIVER-
SITY: PROJECTED CHANGES IN U.S. RACE AND ETINIC COMPOSI-
TION 1995 ro 2050, at http:/www.mbda.gov/doctIments/tin
pubtext.pdf (Dec. 1999).
to Casey, supra note 7, at 15 ("The creation of tribal in-
formation economies could greatly improve the economic
situation of many tribes and their members.").
II Id. at 12. Tribal telecommunications and information
services allow for widespread dissemination of historical
knowledge and customs. As Casey observes, "[c]ommunity
and cultural development is perhaps the development area
most commonly considered for tribal communications." Id.
Increased access to information also enables tribes to more
effectively "control their own destinies and respond to poten-
theless expected to double in the next 30 years.9
Telecommunications capabilities are necessary to
produce a more skilled and marketable workforce
in Native American communities, as well as in-
crease business and investment on tribal lands.'0
Tribal telecommunications services can also be
used as a vehicle for cultural education, political
participation, and inter-tribal communications."
Indeed, many tribes have recognized telecommu-
nications technology as "essential to their future
growth" and are "looking for opportunities to ac-
quire the level of technological infrastructure that
will ensure their place on the Information Super-
highway." 2
III. ULTRAWIDEBAND TECHNOLOGY
Ultrawideband ("UWB") technology operates
by employing very narrow or short duration pulses
that result in large or wideband, transmissions. '"
UWB devices can operate using spectrum occu-
pied by existing radio services, thereby permitting
scarce spectrum resources to be used more effi-
ciently. 14 Although opponents of the technology
argue that UWB emissions cause interference with
other users of the radio spectrum,' 5 there is per-
suasive evidence indicating that there is no harm-
ful interference.' 6
tial political threats and opportunities." Id. Telecommunica-
tions technologies also allow tribes to reestablish links with
tribal members no longer living in Indian country. "These
links would serve to strengthen the social and cultural fabric
of Indian communities and provide for expanded human re-
sources." Id.
12 Id. at 1.
1: Revision of Part 15 Rules, supra note 2, at para. 1.
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., US CPS Industry Council Comments on FCC First
R)ort on Ultra-wideband Technology, 45 MICROWAVE J. 33
(2002); Heather Forsgren, All Sides in UWB Debate Ask For Re-
consideration of FCC Rules, RCR WIRELESS NEwS,June 24, 2002,
at 15.
1O See Joab Jackson, Ultra Wideband Steps Forward, WASH.
TECH., at http://www.twb.org/news/articles/03_2002/Wash
TechMarl902a.pdf (Mar. 19, 2002) ("The Federal Commini-
cations Commission has preliminarily agreed [that ultra
wideband signals won't interfere], though it is doing more
testing.") [hereinafter Jackson]; John McCorkle, Why Such Up-
roar Over Ultrawideband? - Low Powet; Low Cost, High Data Rates,
Precise Positioning Capability and No Intefference - UWB Seems To
Have It All. But How Does It Do That?, COMM. SVs. DESIGN, Mar.
1, 2002 at 31. For a technical explanation of the testing tak-
ing place, see Steven K. Jones, Measured Emissions Data For Use
In Evaluating the Ultra-Wideband (UW3) Emissions Limits in the
Frequency Bands Used By The Global Positioning System (GPS),
Proiect TRB 02-02 Report, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs..public/attachmatch/DA-02-2786A2.doc (Oct. 22,
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Applications of UWB technology include mo-
tion sensing, range finding and radar. One of the
most promising uses of UWB is wireless communi-
cations systems. Wireless communication net-
works using UWB technology can support many
more hosts than wireless networks using other
protocols. Also, UWB can be used in "areas too
obstacle-laden for other wireless protocols to work
in." 17 Because UWB is a "simple, cheap method
for distributing high-bandwidth data wirelessly at
up to a kilometre in range,"' 8 it could be a cost-
effective way to provide high-speed Internet ac-
cess to underserved communities. 19 Indeed, in
preliminary tests on Tonga,20 UWB Internet con-
nections functioned at two to five times the speed
of the fastest cable modem connection in the
United States.21 Finally, many tribes are geograph-
ically isolated and do not have telecommunica-
tions infrastructures so there is little risk of harm-
ful interference to other spectrum users.22 Thus,
UWB technology could offer a cost-effective solu-
tion to the tribal telecommunications crisis.
IV. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION REGULATION OF UWB
Pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended by the Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("the 1996 Act" or "the Communications
Act"), the FCC is responsible for regulating inter-
state and international communications by radio,
television, wire, satellite and cable. 23 Section 301
2002).
17 See Jackson, supra note 16.
18 Mike Butcher, UWB: Widening the Possibilities For Wire-
less, NEW MEDIA AGE, at http://www.uwb.org/news/articles/
04_2002/NewMediaAgeApril402.pdf (Apr. 4, 2002).
I o Jennifer Park, Unlicensed Spectrum Seen As Key For High-
speed Internet Access, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 17, 2000 (noting that
industry executives stated at an FCC-sponsored forum that
"[w]ireless services offered on unlicensed spectrum will be
key to providing high-speed Internet access to underserved
communities .... ).
20 Tonga is a South Pacific island located in Western Pol-
ynesia.
21 See LAWRENCE LESSiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 80-81
(Random House 2001).
22 See, e.g., Hurtig, supra note 4, at 1 (noting in reference
to the project to develop a wireless infrastructure using UWB
and other technologies that "[w] hat might work well for sev-
eral thousand people amid the uncrowded airwaves sur-
rounding Turtle Mountain-125 miles from Minot, North
Dakota, the nearest American city-would be a lot trickier to
deploy for the same number of people in Chicago, and cur-
rently impossible to manage for the city's entire popula-
tion.").
of the Communications Act prohibits the "use or
operat[ion] of any apparatus for the transmission
of energy or communications or signals by radio"
without a license issued by the FCC. 24 Part 15 of
the Commission's Rules authorize the operation
of certain types of radio transmissions without a
license.25 Until recently, the FCC prohibited de-
ployment of all UWB technologies under Part 15
of the Commission's Rules due to concerns that
UWB transmission would interfere with other
users of the radio spectrum.26
Mounting evidence that the risks of interfer-
ence from UWB devices are minimal, has resulted
in the FCC's loosening of its restrictions on UWB
operations. The Revision of Part 15 Rules permits
the marketing and operation of certain types of
imaging, vehicular radar, and communications
and measurement systems that employ UWB tech-
nology.2 7 Because of unresolved interference is-
sues, the FCC chose to "proceed cautiously" in
promulgating UWB emission limits. 28 Specifically,
UWB devices are only authorized to operate in
the frequency band 3.1-10.6 GHz. 29 The FCC
continues to block use of UWB for long range,
wireless Internet.
Recently, the Commission completed reviewing
its UWB rules and issued a further notice of pro-
posed rulemaking seeking additional comment
on a few narrow issues. 30 Due to substantial politi-
cal opposition to more relaxed standards, how-
ever, the current regulations are likely to remain
in place in the foreseeable future.31
23 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000).
24 47 U.S.C. §301 (2000).
25 47 C.F.R. §15.1(b) (2002).
26 47 C.F.R. §15.1(c) (2002) (Devices are permitted to
operate after they have been verified to comply with existing
operational restrictions.).
27 See Revision of Part 15 Rules, supra note 2, at para. 5.
28 Id. at para. 1. The Commission maintained that it was
"proceeding cautiously" based "in large measure on stan-
dards that the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration found to be are necessary to protect
against interference to vital federal government operations."
Id.
29 Id. at para. 5.
30 See Part 151b.PRM, supra note 2, at paras. 1, 153 (pro-
posing changes to the FCC's Part 15 Rules in order to accom-
modate the MSSI radar system, the Siemans VDO radar sys-
tem, Part 15 transmitters and the replacement of the current
UWB definition in the Part 15 Rules with a broader one.).
M" See Patrick Mannion, Busting UWB Clouds, COMM. Sys.
DESIGN, July 1, 2002, at 5 ("[T] he sheer impossibility of prov-
ing a negative, combined with the sway the military has over
all things governmental, still hang like a cloud over UWB's
progression."); Bruce Nordwall, UWB Decision Not a Final Fix,
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V. FCC REGULATION OF TRIBAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
Since the passage of the Communications Act,
the Commission has applied its regulations to tri-
bally owned and non-tribally owned telecommuni-
cation carriers serving tribal lands.32 The FCC
maintains that it has jurisdiction "over the 50
states, the District of Columbia and U.S. posses-
sions."331
The 1996 Act, directed the FCC to take mea-
AviATION WK. & SPACE TEci., Mar. 4, 2002, at 68 ("Just be-
neath the surface are lingering reservations and doubt about
future regulation .... [W]hen the FCC reviews standards for
UWB devices in 6-12 months, it could decide to tighten the
reins[."); Jeffrey Silva, Gov't, Carriers Decry UW3, RCR WIRE-
LESS NEWS, Feb. 18, 2002, at 1.
Various Bush administration agencies and mobile-phone
carriers are exploring options to challenge last week's
Federal Communications Commission decision to au-
thorize ultra-wideband technology, a reaction directly
contradicting agency statements that its action was fully
coordinated within the U.S. government and repre-
sented a consensus of federal agencies. Far from settling
the UWB issue, which over the past three years
mushroomed into a nasty lobbying war that has now
driven a wedge in the administration, the FCC ruling
may have actually fueled the controversy.
3'2 Casey, supra note 7, at 18.
"3 See FEDERAL COMMUNIcATIONS COMMISSION, ABOUT THE,
FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus/html (last modified
Feb. 3, 2003).
34 47 U.S.C. §254(b) (3) (2000). Under Section 254, Con-
gress directed the Commission to establish a Federal-State
Joint Board to make recommendations for the preservation
and advancement of universal service. Specifically, the Joint
Board and the Commission were directed to base their poli-
cies on principles such as:
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-
income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high
cost areas, should have access to telecommunications
and information services, including interexchange ser-
vices and advanced telecommunications and informa-
tion services, that are reasonably comparable to those
services provided in urban areas and that are available at
rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged
for similar services in urban areas.
47 U.S.C. §254(b). The statute also set forth provisions out-
lining a universal service support system. The Act requires a
carrier to meet certain criteria to be designated an eligible
telecommunications carrier in order to receive Lifeline and
other universal service support. 47 U.S.C. §214(e) (I) (2000).
The law requires states to make these designations for carri-
ers over which they have jurisdiction and the FCC to make
designations for carriers that are not subject to state jurisdic-
tion. 47 U.S.C. §214(e) (2)-(6) (2000). Further, "[i]f no com-
mon carrier will provide the services that are supported by
[the] universal service support mechanisms .... the Commis-
sion, with respect to interstate services or an area served by a
common carrier"-not subject to State commission jurisdic-
tion "or a State commission, with respect to intrastate ser-
vices. shall determine which common carrier or carriers are
sures to provide "low-income consumers and
those in rural, insular, and high cost areas" with
greater access to affordable telecommunications
services._3 4 In response to this mandate, the FCC
adopted an official protocol regarding tribes and
took specific actions to facilitate deployment of
telecommunications services to Native American
lands.
In June 2000, the FCC announced a statement
of policy establishing a government-to-govern-
ment relationship with Indian tribes.15 The Com-
best able to provide such service to the requesting unserved
community or portion thereof and shall order such carrier or
carriers to provide such service for that unserved community
or portion thereof." 47 U.S.C. §214(e)(3) (2000).
315 In re Statement of Policy on Establishing a Govern-
ment-to-Government Relationship with Indian Tribes, Policy
Statement, 16 FCC Rcd. 4078 (2000) [hereinafter Statement of
Policy]. The following goals and principles were outlined in
the Order:
1. The Commission will endeavor to work with Indian
Tribes on a government-to-government basis consistent
with the principles of Tribal self-governance to ensure,
through its regulations and policy initiatives, and consis-
tent with Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934,
those Indian Tribes have adequate access to communica-
tions services.
2. The Commission, in accordance with the federal gov-
ernment's trust responsibility, and to the extent practica-
ble, will consult with Tribal governments prior to imple-
menting any regulatory action or policy that will signifi-
cantly or uniquely affect Tribal governments, their land
and resources.
3. The Commission will strive to develop working rela-
tionships with Tribal governments, and will endeavor to
identify innovative mechanisms to facilitate Tribal con-
sultation in agency regulatory processes that uniquely af-
fect telecommtnications compliance activities, radio
spectrum policies, and other telecommunications ser-
vice-related issues on Tribal lands.
4. The Commission will endeavor to streamline its ad-
ministrative process and procedures to remove undue
burdens that its decisions and actions place on Indian
Tribes. As administrative and organizational impedi-
ments that limit the FCC's ability to work with Indian
Tribes, consistent with this Policy Statement, are identi-
fied, the Commission will seek to remove those impedi-
ments to the extent authorized by law.
5. The Commission will assist Indian Tribes in comply-
ing with Federal communications statutes and regula-
tions.
6. The Commission will seek to identify and establish
procedures and mechanisms to educate Commission
staff about Tribal governments and Tribal cultures, sov-
ereignty rights, Indian law, and Tribal commtnications
needs.
7. The Commission will work cooperatively with other
Federal departments and agencies, Tribal, state and lo-
cal governments to further the goals of this policy and to
address communications problems, such as low penetra-
tion rates and poor quality services on reservations, and
other problems of mutual concern.
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mission affirmed its commitment to nine goals
and principles including: working with Indian
tribes on a government-to-government basis con-
sistent with the principles of tribal self-govern-
ance; consulting with tribal governments prior to
implementing any regulatory action or policy that
will significantly or uniquely affect tribal govern-
ments, their land and resources; and assisting
tribes in complying with the Communications Act
and Commission regulations. 36
The FCC has promulgated two rulemakings re-
garding telecommunications and Native Ameri-
can tribes. The first rulemaking resulted in
changes to the Commission's Universal Service
rules aimed at promoting deployment of telecom-
8. The Commission will welcome submissions from Tri-
bal governments and other concerned parties as to
other actions the Commission might take to further the
goals and principles presented herein.
9. The Commission will incorporate these Indian policy
goals into its ongoing and long-term planning and man-
agement activities, including its policy proposals, man-
agement accountability system and ongoing policy devel-
opment processes. Id. at 4081-82.
36 Id.
37 In re Federal-State Board on Universal Service; Pro-
moting Deployment and Subscribership in Unserved and Un-
derserved Areas, Petitions for Designation as an Eligible Tele-
communications Carrier and for Related Waivers to Provide
Universal Service, Twelfth Report and Order, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC
Rcd. 12208, para. 1 (2000) (The changes were intended to:
(1) substantially reduce the costs of telecommunications for
subscribers on Tribal lands; and (2) establish a clear and effi-
cient framework to govern requests for eligible telecommuni-
cations carrier status.) [hereinafter Universal Services Order].
First, the Universal Services Order amended the Commission's
universal service rules to substantially reduce the cost of tele-
phone service for people on tribal lands by providing addi-
tional targeted support to carriers. Specifically, the Universal
Service Order.
* increased the discount off the local phone bill that eli-
gible low-income consumers on tribal lands could re-
ceive under the federal Lifeline program by $25.
Under the new rules, carriers could receive between
$30.25 - $32.85, depending on various factors such as
state matching. The agency hoped that this change
would result in most customers receiving basic local
phone service for $1 a month.
" increased the assistance available for the costs of initi-
ating service provided under the current Link Up pro-
gram. This was intended to reduce the initial connec-
tion charges and line extension costs associated with
initiating phone service to income eligible customers
on tribal lands.
" broadened the consumer qualification criteria for
Lifeline and Link Up so that means-tested, or income-
based, programs in which low-income tribal members
are more likely to participate in are included.
• required eligible telecommunications carriers to pub-
licize the availability of Lifeline and Link Up support
munications infrastructure and subscribership on
tribal lands.3 7 The second rulemaking made
changes to the Commission's wireless service rules
to encourage deployment of wireless service on
tribal lands.38
VI. LEGAL TOOLS FOR TRIBES TO OBTAIN
UWB-BASED OUTDOOR
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
Because UWB-based outdoor communications
systems could provide cost-effective telecommuni-
cations capabilities, tribes should explore legal
tools to enable deployment of such systems on tri-
bal lands. Only two strategies to legalize the use of
in a manner designed to reach those likely to qualify
for those discounts.
Id. at para. 12. Second, the Universal Services Order attempted
to establish a clear and efficient framework to govern re-
quests for eligible telecommunications carrier status. The
Telecommunications Act provides that only an "eligible tele-
communications carrier" as designated under Section 214(e)
of the Commission's Rules shall be eligible to receive federal
universal support. 47 U.S.C. §214(e) (2000). Section
214(e) (2) directs the state commissions to perform the desig-
nation, and Section 214(e) (6) directs the Commission to per-
form the designation in those instances where the state com-
mission lacks jurisdiction to perform the designation. Univer-
sal Services Order, 15 FCC Rcd., at para. 108 (Because the stat-
ute did not address the issue of whether the state or the Com-
mission makes the threshold determination of which govern-
mental entity has jurisdiction to make the designation, there
was uncertainty and confusion regarding the process for ob-
taining eligible telecommunications carrier status. The Or-
der provided that the FCC may designate carriers serving tri-
bal lands as eligible carriers if the Commission determines
that the state lacks jurisdiction to designate and regulate car-
tiers wishing to serve tribal lands. The FCC must consider
"whether state regulation is preempted by federal regulation,
whether state regulation is consistent with tribal sovereignty
and self-determination, and whether the Tribe has consented
to state jurisdiction.").
38 In re Extending Wireless Telecommunications Services
to Tribal Lands, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 11794, para. 1 (2000) [hereinafter
Wireless Policy Order]. First, the Wireless Policy Order established
that bidding credits will be available in future auctions in
markets that contain qualifying tribal areas that have a tele-
phone service penetration rate below 70 percent. Id. at para.
39. Second, although the FCC sought comment on relaxing
certain operational and licensing rules to encourage exten-
sion of service to tribal lands, it concluded that across-the-
board changes to rules aimed at tribes were unnecessary. In-
stead, the Commission noted, "parties should seek waivers of
specific rules or file other requests for regulatory relief in in-
stances where greater flexibility than the rules allow would
facilitate the provision of service to tribal lands." Id. at para.
64. Finally, the Order stated that to avoid splitting tribal
lands among multiple licensing areas, the Commission will
consider tribal land boundaries in defining licensing areas
for future services. Id. at para. 64.
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UWB-based communications systems on tribal
lands will be discussed further in this article. Pur-
suant to the first strategy, tribes can turn to courts
for relief. One potentially colorable legal argu-
ment is tribal sovereignty prevents the FCC from
regulating telecommunications services on tribal
lands. Assuming instead the FCC is empowered to
regulate on tribal lands, a second, alternative ar-
gument is that the FCC has a fiduciary duty to tai-
lor its general regulations to the particular needs
of tribes. This second strategy encourages tribes
to petition the FCC for a waiver of its rules rather
than to litigate.
1. Judicial Relief
A. Does Tribal Sovereignty Bar FCC Regulation of
Tibes ?
First, tribes can argue that tribal sovereignty
does bar FCC regulation of tribes. Because tribes
have not asserted their authority to regulate tele-
communications services, this legal claim is
"largely untested. '3"' Although a 'state supreme
court case and a Commission ruling have dis-
cussed tribal sovereignty with regard to state regu-
lation of non-Indians engaged in commerce on
Indian reservations, they are not pertinent. 4" The
FCC has never "seriously considered its regulatory
authority within Indian Country, nor has that au-
thority ever been seriously challenged." 4' Thus,
'19 Casey, supra note 8, at 18. See also Daniel J. Adam, Th-
bal Telecom: Telecommunications Regulation in Indian Country, 27
J. LEGIS. 153, 155 (2001).
It is difficult however to determine the full extent of tri-
bal jurisdictional authority over telecommunications op-
eration and regulation. Courts and legislatures have not
settled the extent to which tribes can assert jurisdiction
over telecommunications on tribal lands. Typically, par-
ties disagree as to the extent of tribal authority over
physical telecommunications infrastructure on tribal
lands, and over frequency spectrum in the air over tribal
lands. Applying the traditional telecommunications reg-
ulatory structure to Federal Native American law is a
complicated exercise. There has never been a clear defi-
nition of the amount of control that state and federal
regulatory agencies possess over telecommunications
services in Indian country. Most often, federal and state
regulatory agencies have assumed jurisdiction over tele-
communications services within the boundaries of tribal
lands by default, because the tribes on those lands have
not exercised their authority to regulate these services.
40 Compare In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service; Western Wireless Corp. Petition for Designation as
an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier for the Pine Ridge
Reservation in South Dakota, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
16 FCC Rcd. 18133 (2001) (detailing example where tribal
judicial review of the Commission's authority to
regulate tribes will be a matter of first impression.
The Commission can make four arguments in
response to a claim that tribes have sovereignty to
regulate telecommunications services. First, the
Commission can assert that tribes do not have in-
herent sovereignty to regulate UWB, because that
power has been impliedly divested by virtue of the
tribes' dependent status. Second, even if tribes do
have the sovereignty to regulate telecommunica-
tions, Congress has stripped that right under the
plenary power doctrine. Third, if Congress has
not abrogated tribal sovereignty, then it has been
divested by the failure to assert it. Fourth, even if
tribes do have some authority to regulate, it is lim-
ited to regulating Indians on tribal lands. Below,
we address these counterarguments' merits.
i. Implied Divestiture: Have Tribes Lost the Power
to Regulate Telecommunications Services By
Virtue of Their Dependent Status?
The Commission can argue that tribes do not
have inherent sovereignty to regulate UWB. In-
dian tribes derive their authority to exclusively
regulate their internal affairs from: (1) grants of
sovereignty by federal treaties and statutes; 42 and
(2) "inherent" sovereign powers that were not
divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent sta-
tus. 4 _3 Sovereign powers are divested "where the
sovereignty bars state regulation) with Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe Tel. Auth. v. Publ. Utils. Conm'n, 595 N.W.2d 604
(S.D. 1999) (detailing example where tribal sovereignty does
not bar state regulation).
41 See Casey, supra note 7, at 18.
42 See generally VINE DELORIAM JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMAL-
LIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY (Univ. Okla.
Press 1999) (Treaty/statute sovereignty involves rights
granted to Indians by Congressional legislation). Since the
formation of the United States, the federal government has
negotiated and ratified hundreds of treaties with tribes. Id.
4" The Supreme Court has likened the relationship be-
tween the federal government and native tribes to a "guardi-
anship," creating a trust relationship between the two. See
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) ("[A
Tribe's] relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian."). In this relationship, tribes generally
retain sovereign power over their own political, economic,
and social affairs. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 561 (1832) ("[A] weaker power does not surrender its
independence-its right to self government, by associating
with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in
order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the pro-
tection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the
right of government, and ceasing to be a state."). Inherent
sovereignty can be thought of almost as natural law. Id. at 559
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exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsis-
tent with the overriding interests of the National
Government."44 Courts have held that tribes have
an inherent sovereignty to self-govern, including
the power to punish tribal offenders, regulate do-
mestic relations among members, 45 and levy
taxes.46 Courts have also held that tribes do not
(stating that Indian tribes have "always been considered [ I
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights .... ). It is also wholly separate from
treaty or statutory tribal sovereignty. See Brendale v. Confed-
erated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408, 425 (1989) ("[T]ribes have in-
herent sovereignty independent of [treaty] authority .... );
Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n,
935 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e recognize[ ] that
Native Americans possess an inherent sovereign right, inde-
pendent of express treaty language, to exclude non-Native
Americans from their reservation."). Conquest extinguished
tribes' external sovereign powers, such as their abilities to
wage war, conduct foreign relations or have ambassadors.
But tribes, as "a separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal and social relations," United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978), have largely retained exclusive con-
trol over their internal sovereign power. United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory."). Inherent sovereignty
only exists to the extent it is consistent with the dependent
status of tribes. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,
650-51 (2001) ("[T]he inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes
[is] limited. . . 'exercise of tribal power beyond what is neces-
sary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes.'") (internal citations omitted).
44 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville In-
dian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980).
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the
tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a
divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sover-
eignty would be inconsistent with the overriding inter-
ests of the National Government, as when the tribes seek
to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to
non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute non-
Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights. In the present cases, we can
see no overriding federal interest that would necessarily
be frustrated by tribal taxation.
(internal citations omitted). See also Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 n.13 (1982) (NLRB v.
Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002)
("Federal limitations on tribal sovereignty can also occur
when the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent
with overriding national interests."); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326
("These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status
of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessa-
rily inconsistent with their freedom independently to deter-
mine their external relations.").
45 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564
(1981).
[Inherent sovereignty includes] the power to punish tri-
bal offenders, to determine tribal membership, to regu-
late domestic relations among members, and to pre-
scribe rules of inheritance for members. But exercise of
have the sovereignty to freely alienate to non-Indi-
ans the land they OCcupy, 47 enter into direct com-
mercial or governmental relations with foreign
nations, 4  govern any nonmember on a reserva-
tion however the tribe wishes,49 try nonmembers
in tribal courts,5°1 or regulate nonmembers on fee
lands or non-Indian easements within reservation
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is incon-
sistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express congressional delegation.
(internal citations omitted). See also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326
(finding that the powers of self-government, including the
power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are
"not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a
tribe's dependent status.").
46 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141 ("[T]he Tribe's authority to
tax non-Indians who conduct business on the reservation...
is an inherent power."); Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tri-
bal Council, 715 F.2d 486, 488 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Indian tax-
ation of oil and gas leases is a valid exercise of tribal author-
ity. The tribe has a power to tax which derives from the
tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic
activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of pro-
viding governmental services by requiring contributions from
persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within
that jurisdiction."). There are other examples of inherent
sovereignty. Tribes also have the power to be immune from
lawsuit unless the sovereign consents. United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)
("[W]ithout congressional authorization," the "Indian Na-
tions are exempt from suit."). Tribes even have the power to
exclude individuals from the jurisdiction and generally regu-
late nonmembers on the reservation. Cf Occupational Safety
& Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 186 (allowing OSHA inspectors
onto reservation if statute "implicitly" allows for enforce-
ment, though Indians retain general right of exclusion from
their lands, per treaty and inherent sovereignty rights.); Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Tribal au-
thority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands
is an important part of tribal sovereignty."). In January 2002,
the Tenth Circuit potentially expanded the scope of inherent
sovereignty when it concluded that "like states and territo-
ries, [a tribe] has a strong interest as a sovereign in regulat-
ing economic activity involving its own members within its
own territory, and it therefore may enact laws governing such
activity." Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1200. These enumer-
ated capabilities are merely examples, and not an exhaustive
set, of inherent sovereign powers. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353, 361 (2001) ("These examples [given in Montana] show,
we said, that Indians have "the right ... to make their own
laws and be ruled by them..."). Note that these examples of
inherent sovereignty may have been statutorily undermined
and that exceptions do exist.
47 O'Neida Indian Nation v. County of O'Neida, 414 U.S.
671, 667-68 (1985).
48 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553-54.
49 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810)
(afirming that tribes have lost any "right of governing every
person within their [reservation boundary] limits except
themselves") Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 209 (1978)).
51 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191, 196-97.
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boundaries. 5 1
The FCC could argue that tribes' freedom to
control tribal spectrum was divested by virtue of
the tribes' dependent status. The federal govern-
ment has an interest in a national telecommunica-
tions policy, and such a policy requires coherent
and universal regulations that cover tribal lands. If
tribes establish their own spectrum regulations,
interference might occur resulting in chaos, and
undermine the reliability of the entire system.52
As the Supreme Court pronounced in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, "if there is to be any effec-
tive communication by radio, only a few can be
licensed and the rest must be barred from the air-
waves.
5 1
Tribes can respond that they have the sover-
eignty to regulate telecommunications systems
completely within the boundaries of the reserva-
tion. There would be no interference from UVWB
telecommunications systems on a reservation to
other spectrum users, because the Commission
would be permitted to regulate any source that
emits waves outside the boundaries of the reserva-
tion. The FCC can counter that it will be an en-
forcement nightmare to distinguish between
those sources that are confined to the reservation
51 See infira Part VI(l)(A)(ii).
52 See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting & Speech, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 1103, n.10 (1993) ("When more than one sta-
tion in a particular geographic area simultaneously attempts
to use the same piece of spectrum space, the result is chaos.
Thus, for the spectrum to have reliable utility, the right to
exclusive use of a portion of the spectrum must be pro-
tected.").
53 Red Lion Broadcasting. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
388-89 (1969).
54 Ruth Milkman, senior legal advisor to former FCC
Commissioner Reed E. Htndt, identified the jurisdictional is-
sties that the FCC must consider: "Should it be regulated by
the federal government, or should it be regulated by the
states? Well, radio waves do not stop at state borders. Interfer-
ence does not stop at state borders. And so that suggests that
you should have federal ur even international regulation, be-
cause spectrum does not stop at country boundaries either."
See Ruth Milkman, The State Role in Telecommunications Regula-
tion: Working Together: Suggestions For Federal & State Cooptera-
lion in Telecomrnunications, 6 Aiun. L.J. Sci. & TEc:H. 141, 144
(1996).
55 The Supreme Court has often rejected "administrative
convenience" arguments as justifications for subordinating
rights. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 737-41 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting administrative conve-
nience argument as justification for overriding separation of
powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971 ) (holding that administrative
convenience is an insufficient justification for gender dis-
crimination). See also Richard B. Saphire & Michael E.
Solimine, Shoring Up Article Ill: Legislative Court Doctrine in the
and others that might leak off the reservation.
However, tribes can highlight the fact that the
Commission has experience in resolving jurisdic-
tional issues involving states and foreign coun-
tries. 54 Furthermore, administrative burdens may
not be the type of "overriding interests of the Na-
tional Government" that compel a conclusion of
implied divestiture of sovereignty. 55 Ultimately, it
is uncertain if a court would conclude that tele-
communications regulations are like other forms
of tribal self-government and consistent with the
dependent status of Indian tribes.
ii. Has Congress Abrogated Sovereignty Under the
Plenary Power Doctrine?
If a court concludes that tribal power to regu-
late telecommunications services was not divested
by virtue of the dependent status of tribes, it will
then need to evaluate whether Congress has abro-
gated tribal sovereignty under the plenary power
doctrine. Tribal sovereignty "exists only at the suf-
ferance of Congress."5 1' Thus, Congress can divest
any tribal powers under the plenary power doc-
trine.57 To divest tribal power, a court will first try
to determine if Congress intended to abrogate tri-
Post CFTCv. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 122 (1988) (noting
that Court has rejected "administrative convenience" argu-
ments in separation of powers context).
56 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
57 See Donovan v. Couer d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d
113, 115 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Indian tribes possess only a limited
sovereignty that is subject to complete defeasance."). Under
the plenary power doctrine, Congress can abrogate formerly
guaranteed treaty or statutory rights. See Reich v. Great Lakes
Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir.
1993) ("Indian treaties are deemed the legal eqtivalent of
federal statutes and they can therefore be modified or even
abrogated by Congress."); Brendae, 492 U.S. at 422 (which
affirmed Montana, 450 U.S. at 561) ("treaty rights with re-
spect to reservation lands must be read in light of the subse-
quent alienation of those lands pursuant to a Congressional
statute."); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594
(1977) ("When treaties were entered into between the
United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that
the power to abrogate existed in Congress... [and] the judi-
ciary cannot question or inquire into the motive which
prompted [abrogation]."). Even tribal self-government is
subject to termination or limitation if Congress clearly divests
a tribe of such authority. See Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (upholding Congress's
right to terminate tribes, but cautioning that a court must
base a finding that Congress has abrogated or modified a
treaty with Indian tribe on clear evidence); STEPHEN L.
PEVAR, THE RIGHrs OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 58 (2d ed. 1992)
("Termination abolishes tribal government and eliminates all
tribal landholdings.").
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bal sovereignty. If a court finds that Congress in-
tended to abrogate tribal sovereignty, then the
statute in question governs those activities on tri-
bal lands. If Congress' intent is uncertain, the
court will need to determine whether Congress in-
tended to abrogate sovereignty under the Tusca-
rora rule.58
a. Is there Congressional Intent to Abrogate Tribal
Sovereignty In Telecommunications?
To determine whether Congress intended to
abrogate tribal sovereignty, 59 a court will first look
for explicit language in the legislative history of
the Communications Act stating that the statute
applies to tribes. If the text of the statute does not
58 See infra Part Vl(1)(A)(ii)(b).
59 Tribal sovereignty is distinct from tribal sovereign im-
munity. Tribal sovereignty bars application of a statute to a
tribe while tribal sovereign immunity bars a private suit by an
individual brought against the tribe. There is a higher stan-
dard of proof for congressional intent to abrogate sovereign
immunity than sovereignty. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)) (stating that a Congressional
waiver of sovereign immunity from suit "'cannot be implied
but must be unequivocally expressed"'). The Eleventh Cir-
cuit holds that the test for abrogating tribal sovereign immu-
nity applies to federal agencies. See Florida Paraplegic Ass'n v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1131 (lth Cir.
1999). However, this is a misstatement of commonly under-
stood law. Tribal sovereign immunity can only be invoked in
private suits by individuals-not the federal government. See
EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("Indian tribes do not, however, enjoy sovereign
immunity from suits brought by the federal government.").
60 See, e.g., Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d
174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting tribe's proposal to force
"Congress [to] express[ ] its specific intent to abrogate tribal
sovereignty" as unworkable and also failing to review the leg-
islative history or comprehensive statutory plan to determine
the general applicability of OSHA).
61 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545,
554 (10th Cir. 1986).
We now examine congressional intent as an aid to inter-
preting the statute. That intent is so clearly expressed in
legislative history and so strong that it is dispositive of
the issue of the statute's reach. When "interpreting a
statute, the court will not look merely to a particular
clause in which general words may be used, but will take
in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on
the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as
indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a
construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legisla-
ture."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
62 Compare Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 557 ("Finally, we
have taken into consideration the EPA's own interpretation
of the statute. Soon after the passage of the 1977 amend-
ments to the Act, the EPA's general counsel ruled that the
EPA has the authority to prescribe an underground injection
discuss applicability to tribes, a court may con-
clude that congressional intent is uncertain and
proceed to an analysis of what inference should
be made about tribal sovereignty in light of this
congressional silence. 60 However, most courts will
evaluate whether the wording of the statute, legis-
lative history and the existence of a comprehen-
sive statutory plan evidence Congressional intent
to strip tribal sovereignty. 6' Some courts even ac-
cord some deference to an agency's interpreta-
tion of congressional intent to abrogate sover-
eignty; although other courts explicitly refuse to
do So. 6 2 Generally, intent must be "plain and un-
ambiguous" for stripping nontreaty sovereignty
(i.e. inherent sovereignty)6" and "clear and relia-
ble" and "sufficiently compelling" for stripping
program for the Osage Reserve. As stated previously, the EPA
promulgated its regulation asserting jurisdiction over Indian
lands under Part C of the SDWA. Appropriate deference is
due to the agency's own interpretation of the statute." (inter-
nal citations omitted)) with Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135,
1140 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We agree with appellants insofar as
they contend that the scope of inherent tribal authority is a
question of law for which EPA is entitled to no deference.").
Because "courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory
construction," such deference bears little weight in the final
determination. Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 557 (citing
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272
(1968)).
63 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 247-48 (1985) ("The Court has applied canons of con-
struction in nontreaty matters. Most importantly, the Court
has held that congressional intent to extinguish Indian title
must be 'plain and unambiguous,' and will not be 'lightly im-
plied.'") (internal citations omitted)) United States v. Santa
Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S 339,346 (1941); EEOC v. Cherokee
Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989) ("We believe that
unequivocal Supreme Court precedent dictates that in cases
where ambiguity exists (such as that posed by the ADEA's si-
lence with respect to Indians), and there is no clearindication
of congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty rights
(as manifested, e.g., by the legislative history, or the existence
of a comprehensive statutory plan), the court is to apply the
special canons of construction to the benefit of Indian inter-
ests."); Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1194 (which affirmed
Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d at 939); EEOC v. Fond du Lac
Heavy Equip. & Const. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993)
("Specific Indian rights will not be deemed to have been ab-
rogated or limited absent a 'clear and plain' congressional
intent. A clear and plain intent may be demonstrated by an
,express declaration' in the statute, by the 'legislative history,'
and by 'surrounding circumstances."' (internal citations
omitted)). However, in at least one case, the Tenth Circuit
has required a nondescript lower bound of merely "some"
legislative history to sovereignty-strip. See Donovan v. Navajo
Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 714 (10th Cir. 1982)
(holding that " [1] imitations on tribal self-government cannot
be implied from a treaty or statute; they must be expressly
stated or otherwise made clear from surrounding circum-
stances and legislative history," and that "[a]bsent some ex-
pression of such legislative intent, [the court] shall not per-
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treaty sovereignty. 1 4
The Communications Act does not explicitly
state that tribes are subject to regulation. As such,
tribes could argue that a court should conclude
that there is no clear congressional intent to abro-
gate sovereignty and proceed to an analysis of
where presumption should lie under Tuscarora.
The FCC can contend that the scope of applica-
tion sections set out in the 1934 Act, the Universal
Service mandate and the minority broadcasting
provisions inserted in the 1996 Act and the failed
1997 Indian Telecommunications Act are "plain
and unambiguous" evidence that Congress in-
tended to strip tribes of sovereignty over telecom-
munications regulation.
1. The Communications Act of 1934: 47 U.S.C.
§§152, 153 and 301
The Commission can point to several provisions
of the Communications Act to prove Congres-
sional intent to strip tribes of spectrum regulatory
authority. The most compelling provisions are 47
U.S.C. §§152, 153, and § 301. Section 152 states
that the provisions of the Communications Act ap-
ply to:
"[Alit persons engaged within the United States in such
communication or such transmission of energy by ra-
dio, and to the licensing and regulating of all radio sta-
tions as hereinafter provided; but it shall not apply to
persons engaged in wire or radio communication or
transmission in [the Philippine Islands or] the Canal
Zone, or to the wire or radio communication or trans-
mission wholly within the [Philippine Islands or] the
Canal Zone. '""'
Section 153 of the U.S. Code defines the United
mit divestiture of the tribal power to manage reservation
lands so as to exclude non-Indians from entering [ ] merely
on the predicate that federal statutes of general application
apply to Indians . . . unless Indians are expressly excepted
therefrom.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
64 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986).
[W]e have looked to the statute's "legislative history"
and "surrounding circumstances" as well as to "the face
of the Act." Explicit statement by Congress is preferable
for the purpose of ensuring legislative accountability for
the abrogation of treaty rights. We have not rigidly inter-
preted that preference, however, as a per se nile; where
the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is suffi-
ciently compelling, "the weight of authority indicates
that such an intent can also be found by a reviewing
court from clear and reliable evidence in the legislative
history of a statute." What is essential is clear evidence
that Congress actually considered the conflict between
its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty
rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty.
States as: "the several States and Territories, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the possessions of the
United States, but does not include the Canal
Zone." "" Section 301 of the U.S. Code describes
the scope of regulations governing radio commu-
nications or transmissions of energy:
"No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the
transmission of energy or communications or signals by
radio (a) from one place in any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States or in the District of Colum-
bia to another place in the same State, Territory, pos-
session, or District... except under and in accordance
with this [Act] .... 67
Finally, the Act includes delegation provisions em-
powering the FCC to take any action necessary to
fulfill its mandate. 68
The FCC can argue that "states, territories, and
possessions" include tribes; because the Commu-
nications Act regulates "all persons" within the de-
fined regions, it is arguable that the terms refer to
geographic areas and not to "states, territories, or
possessions" in their political sense. Thus, the
FCC can contend that because tribal lands are in-
cluded within the exterior boundaries of the
United States and within any state or territory in
which they are located, Congress intended to reg-
ulate tribal lands.6
9
In response, tribes can argue that the weight of
authority concludes that tribes are not "states, ter-
ritories, or possessions." The Constitution refers
to States and Indian tribes as distinct entities for
commerce purposes. 71 Further, courts have held
that reservations are not "states, territories, or pos-
sessions" of the United States pursuant to full
Id.
65 47 U.S.C. §152 (2000) (emphasis added).
66 47 U.S.C. §153 (2000) (emphasis added).
67 47 U.S.C. §301 (2000) (emphasis added).
(is See 47 U.S.C. §154(i) (2000) (authorizing the Commis-
sion to "perform any and all acts, make such rules and regu-
lations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this
[Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its func-
tions."). See aLso 47 U.S.C. §303(r) (2000) (authorizing the
Commission to "[m]ake such rules and regulations and pre-
scribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with
law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act.").
l6') Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560 (stating boundary lines sepa-
rate the States and Indian lands and that the regulation of
"intercourse" with Indian tribes belongs to the U.S. govern-
ment).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have
Power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.") (emphasis
added).
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faith and credit statutes, 71 the National Labor Re-
lations Act,72 and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act ("OSH1A").7-
A court is likely to be able to distinguish the
terms used in these statutes and conclude that the
Communications Act includes tribes. Where the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") permits
"states and territories" to enact "right to work"
laws, Congress was clearly referring to states and
territories as political entities and not as geo-
graphic entities.74 In the context of full faith and
credit statutes, the terms are referring to the courts
of "states, territories, or possessions. ' 75 Con-
versely, in the context of telecommunications law,
the terms "states, territories, or possessions" make
more sense if they are understood as describing
geographic boundaries and not political entities.
Telecommunications laws are intended to govern
activities on the lands of states, territories and pos-
sessions-not the activities of the governments of
states, territories or possessions.
The Tenth Circuit adopted this latter reasoning
in the context of environmental regulation. In
Phillips Petroleum, the Safe Drinking Water Act
("SDWA") required "states" to adopt and ade-
71 See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir.
1997); New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468,
474-75 (1909) (citing with approval Ex Parte Morgan, 20 F.
298, 305 (W.D. Ark. 1883) in which the district court held
that the Cherokee nation was not a "territory" under the fed-
eral extradition statute); Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d
689, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Morgan, 20 F. 298)
(holding that an Indian reservation is not a territory for pur-
poses of full faith and credit); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738
(Alaska 1999); Anderson v. Engelke, 954 P.2d 1106 (Mont.
1998). But see United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 100, 104 (1855) (holding that "territory" included the
Cherokee nation when used in a statute requiring the courts
of the District of Columbia to give full faith and credit to the
appointments of administrators by the courts of the territo-
ries); Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897) (fed-
eral courts bound to accord full faith and credit to the laws
and judgments of tribal courts); Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F.
305 (8th Cir. 1894); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (8th Cir.
1894); Exendine v. Pore, 56 F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893); Mehlin v.
Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893);Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533
P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (citing Mackey and considering tribes
within state borders as territories for purposes of the Full
Faith and Credit Act); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895
(Idaho 1982) (categorizing Idaho tribes as territories pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. §1738); In re Huehl, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash.
1976) (concluding that tribes are entitled to full faith and
credit).
72 Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1192 ("Indian tribes are
neither states, nor part of the federal government, nor subdi-
visions of either. Rather, they are sovereign political entities
possessed of sovereign authority not derived from the United
States, which they predate.").
quately enforce an approved underground injec-
tion control program.7 6 The Tenth Circuit held
that Congress' emphasis on a national concern
for unsafe drinking water and the fact that water
"does not respect state boundaries," means the
term "state refers to a geographic area, not neces-
sarily a political entity. '77 Tribes can attempt to
distinguish Phillips Petroleum by pointing out that
the tribe in Phillips supported application of the
Safe Drinking Water Act.78 Here, tribes are assert-
ing their sovereignty to resist the application of
the Communications Act to tribal lands. However,
like environmental pollution, radio communica-
tions cross state boundaries and the existence of a
comprehensive scheme to regulate communica-
tions proves that Congress "did not intend to
leave any lands, regardless of the jurisdictional
control over those lands, unprotected. 79
The legislative history of the Communications
Act provides support for interpreting "states, terri-
tories, and possessions" as geographic terms. The
language defining the scope of the Communica-
tions Act was modeled after the Interstate Com-
merce Act.8 0 Courts have held that Congress
clearly intended the Interstate Commerce Act to
73 Reich, 95 F.3d at 181 ("[T]ribes are not states under
OSHA and thus, OSHA does not preempt tribal safety regula-
tions in the same manner in which it preempts state laws.")
(internal citations omitted).
74 29 U.S.C. §164(b) (2000).
75 28 U.S.C. §1738 (2000) ("Such Acts, records and judi-
cial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Pos-
session from which they are taken.").
76 Phillips Petroleum Co., 803 F.2d at 548.
77 Id. at 554-55 (emphasis removed).
78 See Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1199 ("Far from at-
tempting to exercise its sovereign authority to enact a com-
peting regulation, the tribe supported the federal regulation
and indicated its approval by tribal resolution; it was a third
party (Phillips Petroleum) that challenged the application of
the regulation.").
79 Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 556 ("Like the SDWA,
the Resource Conservation Recvery Act provides for a com-
prehensive federal-state scheme to regulate the disposal of
hazardous waste.").
80 See S. REP. No. 781, at 1-11 (1934), reprinted in IRVING
J. SLOAN, 5 AM. LANDMARK LEGISLATION 496, 507 (1977)
("This bill is so written as to enact the powers which the In-
terstate Commerce Commission and the Radio Commission
now exercise over communications, by means of definite stat-
utory provisions .... In this bill many provisions are copied
verbatim from the Interstate Commerce Act because they ap-
ply directly to communication companies doing a common
carrier business.") [hereinafter Irving]. "I recommend that
the Congress create a new agency to be known as the Federal
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apply to tribes."' By extension, Congress may also
have intended the Communications Act to govern
communications taking place on tribal lands.82
2. The Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Universal Service and Minority Broadcasting
The Commission can argue that the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") is not dispositive,
but that the Universal Service mandate and the
minority broadcasting provisions of the 1996 Act
do provide evidence of Congress' intent to abro-
gate tribal sovereignty. First, the 1996 Act directed
Communications Commission, such agency to be vested with
the authority now lying in the Federal Radio Commission
and with such authority over communications as now lies
with the Interstate Commerce Commission-the services af-
fected to be all of those which rely on wires, cables, or radio
as a medium of transmission." Id. at 512-13.
I call attention, however, in the beginning to the fact
that probably 70 to 75 pages of it comprise a rewriting of
existing radio law and its amendments and of the Inter-
state Commerce Act and its amendments .... In 1910
an amendment was adopted which applied certain provi-
sions of the then Interstate Commerce Act to telephone
and telegraph companies and added certain new provi-
sions. Since that time the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion has given what might be called cursory attention to
the regulation of telephone and telegraph matters, but
in practical operation the regulation of the telephone
and telegraph companies has been really nothing effec-
tive. It has amounted to very little. The Interstate Com-
merce Commission has been so busy with railroad ques-
tions that it has never given much attention to tele-
phone and telegraph companies, and the latter business
has grown only recently to such proportions that there
have been sufficient complaints on the part of the public
to seem to justify a separate organization to regulate and
control them .... Most of the definitions-and there
are considerable number of definitions-are taken from
the present Radio Act, from the Interstate Commerce
Act .... Title 11 is the common-carrier section, and pro-
vides for the regulation of telephones and telegraphs,
both wire and wireless. Under this title most of the sec-
tions are taken from the Interstate Commerce Act.
81 Id. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Bowles, 40 S.W. 899,
902 (Indian Terr. 1897).
Counsel for appellee contend that the words "territory
of the United States," used in this act, apply only to the
organized territories, and that, as the Indian Territory is
neither a state nor an organized territory of the United
States, the interstate commerce act does not apply to the
Indian Territory.... The words "from any state or terri-
tory of the United States" having been used in the first
part of the section, subsequently the act refers to "any
place in the United States to an adjacent foreign coun-
try, or from any place in the United States through any
foreign country to any other place in the United States."
From this it would appear that congress at least intended
that these latter clauses of the act should apply to the
Indian Territory, for it is a place in the United States
the FCC to take measures to provide "low-income
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high
cost areas" with greater access to affordable tele-
communications services.8 Although the statute
does not explicitly identify Indians or tribes as
part of the consumers located in "rural, insular,
and high cost areas," the legislative history could
be interpreted to suggest that the Act intended to
enhance telecommunications deployment to Na-
tive Americans on tribal lands.8 4 Accordingly, the
FCC can argue that the duty created by the 1996
Act reaffirms a background assumption that tribes
are subject to its regulations; that is, the Commis-
.... These clauses in the act, taken in connection with
the words "or territory of the United States," evidently
determine the intention of congress, and show its inten-
tion to make the interstate commerce law apply to any
shipment from any place in the United States to any
other place in a different jurisdiction. In other words, it
is to apply to all shipments which are not wholly made
within the bounds of any state in the Union.
Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
The Tribe says that Congress in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act did not rely on, or purport to exercise, its
power to regulate commerce 'with the Indian Tribes,'...
The Board regulates labor disputes affecting interstate
commerce, and the Act authorizes it to do so without
stating any exception which would preclude its acting
with respect to a plant located within an Indian reserva-
tion, or one employing Indians. Congress need not cite
or purport to rely on all its powers, when reliance on a
single power is ample to sustain its mandate. Nor is its
failure to mention its power over commerce with the In-
dian tribes any indication that it intended to narrow its
action with respect to interstate commerce in the man-
ner suggested by appellants.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Gist, 190 P. 878, 885 (Okla. 1920)
(noting that "defendants complied with the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act and filed with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission their tariff rates on shipments from the
Indian Territory .
82 Cf Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 462 (1990) (citing
Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 737 (9th Cir. 1987)) ("The
Imere borrowing of statutory language does not imply that
Congress also intended to incorporate all of the baggage that
may be attached to the borrowed language.").
83 47 U.S.C. §254(b)(3) (2000).
84 See, e.g., Testimony of Senator Burns before the S.
Committee on Comm, Sci. & Transp., 103rd Cong. 110-11
(1994) ("My vision of the National Information Infrastruc-
ture is a broadband interactive communications network ac-
cessible at affordable rates that also empowers minorities, in-
dividuals with disabilities, women, especially single mothers
and native Americans. This is what I mean when I say all
Americans."). See also id. at 503 (President of a Native Ameri-
can owned telecommunications company notes, "United
Utilities customers and rural residents nationwide have been
the beneficiaries of the universal service goal set out in the
1934 Communications Act. Without Congress' and the FCC's
pursuance of this goal, our customers would not have tele-
phone service.").
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sion could not facilitate deployment of telecom-
munications services on tribal lands without first
having the jurisdiction to regulate such services.
Tribes can argue that the duty created by the
Universal Service provisions does not give rise to
the right to apply general communications regula-
tions to tribes. However, a court is likely to con-
clude that the Universal Service mandate supports
the Commission's position that it may regulate
communications services on tribal lands. In Phil-
lips Petroleum, the SDWA mandated that the EPA
install its own federally administered program if a
"state" failed to adopt or adequately enforce an
approved underground injection control pro-
gram. 5 In concluding there was Congressional in-
tent to regulate tribes, the court stressed the fact
that "Congress expressly stated its concern that In-
dians should enjoy the benefits of clean drinking
water as should all Americans."8
Second, the Communications Act directs the
Commission to grant licensing preferences to mi-
nority groups. These include American Indians.87
The Commission can argue that Congress in-
tended tribally owned carriers serving tribal lands
to use these licensing procedures. Tribes can ar-
gue that the provisions are directed at carriers
owned by Native American people as a racial
group and not tribes per se. Ultimately, a court is
likely to conclude that the 1996 Act further bol-
sters the conclusion that there is Congressional
intent to include tribes within the jurisdiction of
the Commission.
3. The 1997 Indian Telecommunications Act
The failure of Congress to pass the Native
American Telecommunications Act of 1997 ("Na-
tive American Telecom Act" or "NATA") 88 may
provide additional evidence of Congressional in-
85 Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 548 (construing The Safe
Drinking Water Act §1422(c), 42 U.S.C. §300 h-I (c) (1986)).
86 Id. at 555-56.
87 See 47 U.S.C. §309(i) (3) (C) (ii) (2000).
88 See Native Am. Telecomm. Act of 1997, H.R. 555,
105th Cong. (1997).
89 Id. at §2(a) (adding § 12(b)(2) to Title I of the Com-
munications Act of 1934).
90 Id. at §2(a) (adding § 12(d) to Title I of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934).
91 Compare Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S.
164, 186 (1994) (noting that "it is impossible to assert with
any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act rep-
resents affirmative congressional approval of the [courts']
tent to include tribes within the jurisdiction of the
FCC. The NATA states that the Commission "shall
promote the exercise of sovereign authority of tri-
bal governments over the establishment of com-
munications policies and regulations within their
jurisdictions. '9 Under the NATA, the Commis-
sion is required to "forbear from applying any
provision of this Act, or any regulation thereun-
der to the extent that such forbearance-is neces-
sary to ensure compliance with the trust responsi-
bility of the United States." 90 The Commission
can argue that failure to enact legislation that
would have increased tribal sovereignty is further
evidence of an underlying understanding that tri-
bal sovereignty has already been abrogated. The
weight accorded to this argument will depend on
the court's willingness to consider a failed bill as
evidence of Congressional intent.91
In the final analysis, after a court evaluates the
goals and wording of the Communications Act
and the corresponding legislative history, the
court will be able to conclude that Congress in-
tended to abrogate tribal sovereignty in telecom-
munications.
b. If There Is No Congressional Intent, Does
Silence Mean Sovereignty Has Been Abrogated?
If the court does not find evidence of Congres-
sional intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty for
telecommunications services, the court will decide
whether it should presume the Communications
Act is intended to regulate tribes. Courts have
generally relied on the Tuscarora rule, which cre-
ates a presumption that legislation applies to
tribes in the absence of congressional intent.9 2 A
recent decision by the Tenth Circuit, however,
suggests a dramatic shift in the favor of tribes
under such circumstances. 93
statutory interpretation .... Congress may legislate, moreo-
ver, only through the passage of a bill which is approved by
both Houses and signed by the President" (internal citations
omitted) (quotation marks omitted)) with BobJones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 601 (1983) (holding that the IRS
decision to deny tax-exempt status to two fundamentalist
schools which maintained racially discriminatory admissions
policies was consistent with congressional intent in part be-
cause the legislative history revealed that Congress had failed
to enact 13 bills introduced to overturn the IRS interpreta-
tion of the statute which was silent on the issue).
92 Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
362 U.S. 99 (1960).
93 See infra Part VI(1)(A)(ii)(b)(2).
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1. The Tuscarora Rule & Couer d'Alene
Exceptions
In Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation,.94 the Supreme Court stated in dicta that
generally applicable federal statutes apply to
tribes: "It is now well settled by many decisions of
this Court that a general statute in terms applying
to all persons includes Indians and their property
interests."' 5 Although legal commentators have
criticized the Tuscarora Rule -G and the Tenth Cir-
94 Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 99.
95 Id. at 116. The statute at issue in Tuscarora was the Fed-
eral Power Act ("FPA"). In the FPA, Congress authorized the
licensing of construction of a power plant. The Federal
Power Commission, authorized under the FPA, determined
that plant construction necessitated appropriation of por-
tions of the Tuscaroras' tribal land. The portions to be ap-
propriated were held by the tribe in fee simple rather than by
treaty with the United States. Yet, the FPA explicitly pro-
tected lands designated as "reservations" by providing that
"the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the pur-
pose for which such reservation was created or acquired." 1(.
at 110. The FPA further defined reservations as "national for-
ests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, mili-
tary reservations, and other lands and interests in lands
owned by the United States . I..." d. at Il. The Tuscarora
Court, relying solely on tax cases involving individual Indians
(not tribes), extended a canon of interpretation (which
theretofore had been unique to tax statutes) to all statutes of
general applicability, as they relate to Indian tribes. Thus, in-
terpreting the statute literally using a canon taken out of con-
text, the Court reasoned that interference with tribal reserva-
tions occurred only when the United States had an owner-
ship interest in the land. In spite of the Tuscaroras holding
the land in fee simple, the Court reasoned that the land was
not a part of the reservation, and hence, was subject to con-
demnation tinder the FPA. Id. at 123-24. Couer d'Alene, 751
F.2d at 1115 ("The [defendant] may be correct when it ar-
gues that this language from Tuscarora is dictum, but it is dic-
tum that has guided many of our decisions.") (emphasis in
original); Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1202 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ("Though dicta, [Tuscarora's] language indicates
the Court's position that the case law supports a presumption
that federal statutes of general applicability apply to Indian
tribes.").
96 See Kristen E. BUrge, EJSA & Indian 7ibes: Altern alive
Approaches For Respecting Tribal Sovereignty, 2000 Wis. L. REv.
1291 (2000); William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Applica-
tion of Federal & State Labor & Employment Laws to Indian Tribal
Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1365 (1995); Vicki J. Limas,
Application of Federal Labor & Employment Statutes to Native
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty & Achieving Consistency,
26 ARIz. Sr. L.J. 681 (1994); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicabil-
ity of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes & Reser-
vation Indians, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 85 (1991). The sound-
ness of the Tuscarora rule is primarily questionable, because
the case dealt solely with property interests of Indians, and
addressed neither tribal sovereignty, nor tribal self-govern-
ance. Moreover, the Tuscarora Court consistently referred to
"persons" and "Indians," not "tribes." The calculus whether a
federal statute of general applicability applies to Indian tribes
cuit has recently rejected it,97 most courts con-
tinue to adhere to it.98 In Donovan v. Couer d'Alene
Tribal Farm, the Ninth Circuit observed three ex-
ceptions to the Tuscarora Rule. The Rule does not
apply where "(1) the law touches 'exclusive rights
of self-governance in purely intramural matters';
(2) the application of the law to the tribe would
'abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties'; or
(3) there is proof 'by legislative history or some
other means that Congress intended [the law] not
to apply to Indians on their reservations . . .
is fundamentally different than that reserved for Indians in
their individual capacity, as only the former must entertain
issues of sovereignty and self-governance. Another important,
yet frequently overlooked criticism of Tuscarora is the "fed-
eral policy context" argument. The Court has suggested that
a statute that is purported to strip inherent sovereignty must
be viewed in the context of the prevailing federal policy to-
ward tribes at the time of statutory interpretation. See Santa
Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 60 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,172 (1973)) ("Indian sover-
eignty. . .[is] a backdrop against which the applica-
ble...federal statut[e] must be read .... "); Pueblo of San
Juan, 276 F.3d at 1195 ("The Court's teachings also require
us to consider tribal sovereignty as a 'backdrop,' against
which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always
be measured .... "); F. COHEN, HANDIBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 242 (1982) (noting that statutes should be interpreted
in light of the current federal policy to promote tribal self-
determination and economic self-sufficiency). Tuscarora was
decided in the Termination Era (1953-1968), during which
Indian sovereignty was sharply curtailed. This hostility against
tribal rights has most definitely softened in both the judiciary
and the political branches. As such, there is a persuasive ar-
gument that the Tuscarora Rule, even if it was once good law,
is inconsistent with the modern federal view of the scope of
tribes' sovereign rights, and must be reevaluated.
97 See Pueblo oJ San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1186 (rejecting Tus-
carora).
98 See Reich, 95 F.3d at 174; United States v. White, 237
F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2001); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868
F.2d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous.
Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Baker, 63 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1995); Lumber Indus. Pension
Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683
(9th Cir. 1991); Occupational Safely & Health Comm'n, 935
F.2d at 182; Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d
1457, 1462 (10th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. Ala. Intertribal Council
Title IVJ.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001); Florida
Paraplegic Ass'n, 166 F.3d at 1129.
99. Couer d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116. Couer d'Alene involved a
commercial farm owned and operated by an Indian Tribe.
The farm sold produce from the farm in open interstate mar-
kets. It employed non-Indians and "[a]part from its tribal
ownership, the farm [wa]s similar in its operation and activi-
ties to other farms in the area." /d. at 1114. An OSHA inspec-
tor issued fines for a myriad of workplace safety violations on
the farm. The Indian tribe contended that its inherent sover-
eign powers barred application of OS1IA to its activities, ab-
sent an express Congressional decision to that effect. Consis-
tent with the Tuscarora Rule, the Ninth Circuit observed that
the issue was "whether congressional silence should be taken
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There is nothing in the legislative history of the
Communications Act indicating that Congress in-
tended to exempt tribes from the Act's scope.
This renders the third Couer d'Alene exception in-
apposite. Thus, if the court chooses to adhere to
the presumptions afforded by Tuscarora and the
Couer d'Alene exceptions, tribes can argue that reg-
ulation of tribal telecommunications falls within
one of the other two Couer d'Alene exceptions: (1)
federal regulation of telecommunications touches
exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intra-
mural matters; or (2) the application of the Tele-
communications Act to tribes abrogates rights
guaranteed by Indian treaties.
(i) Does Federal Regulation of Tribal
Telecommunications Services "Touch Exclusive
Rights of Self-Governance In Purely
Intramural Matters"?
First, tribes can argue that federal regulation of
as an expression of intent to exclude tribal enterprises from
the scope of an Act to which they would otherwise be sub-
ject." Id. at 1115.
100 See Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115; Reich, 95 F.3d at
179; Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. See also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676, 685-86 (1990) (The tribes' "retained sovereignty"
reaches only that power "needed to control ... internal rela-
tions, . . . preserve their own unique customs and social or-
der[, and] . . .prescribe and enforce rules of conduct for
[their] own members.").
101 Nero, 892 F.2d at 1463 ("[N]o right is more integral
to a tribe's self-governance than its ability to establish its
membership.").
102 See, e.g., Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445
(1997) ("The inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe
... do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe."); Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-65 (The "Indian tribes re-
tain their inherent power ... to regulate domestic relations
among members .. "); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602,
605 (1916) (holding that adultery committed by one Indian
with another Indian on an Indian reservation is domestic re-
lations, and generally, domestic relations are "the relations of
the Indians among themselves-the conduct of one toward
another."); Reich, 95 F.3d at 179; United States v. White, 237
F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2001); Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wild-
life Comm'n, 4 F.3d at 502 ("It is rather obvious that off-reser-
vation fishing, hunting and gathering involve relations be-
tween Indians and non-Indians and thus by definition are
not 'purely intramural."'); Smart, 868 F.2d at 932; Florida Par-
aplegicAss'n, 166 F.3d at 1129.
103 See Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 249.
104 Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d at 1080 (holding
that tribal housing authority is "an arm of the tribal govern-
ment" and thus immune from suit by an Indian member in
federal court); Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205
F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding a non-profit with
Indian members is an "arm of the sovereign tribes" and
"more than a mere business" and is entitled to sovereign im-
telecommunications services touches the exclu-
sive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters. Couer d'Alene described "purely intramu-
ral matters" as those that threaten the "political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe." 100 For example, courts have
held that "purely intramural matters" includes
matters relating to tribal membership, 0 1 domes-
tic relations,10 2 tribal hiring practices, 103 and pri-
vate suits for actions arising on a reservation.0 4
Some courts have even held that "purely intramu-
ral matters" include the right to exclude non-Indi-
ans in general-and federal employees, in partic-
ular-from a reservation1 1 5 as well as tribal con-
trol of economic activity on the reservation.10" To
determine whether a matter is purely intramural,
courts evaluate (1) the nature of the activity, (2)
whether non-Indians are involved and (3)
whether the activity operates in interstate com-
merce.
10 7
Tribes can argue that tribal regulation of UWB
munity as an agent of tribal government); Fond du Lac, 986
F.2d at 249 (holding the ADEA will not apply to Indians for
employer age rules because age "should be allowed to be re-
stricted (or not restricted) by the tribe in accordance with its
culture and traditions."); Taylor v. Ala. Intertribal Council Ti-
tle IVJ.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir. 2001) (follow-
ing the rationale of Fond du Lac).
105 Compare Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692
F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[Ain Indian tribe's power to
exclude non-Indians from tribal lands is an inherent attri-
bute of tribal sovereignty, essential to a tribe's exercise of self-
government and territorial management.") (emphasis omit-
ted) with Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1117 n.3 ("To whatever
extent the Tenth Circuit's [right-to-exclude] decision [in
Navajo Forest Products] is not tied to the existence of an ex-
press treaty right, we disagree with it."); see Occupational Safety
& Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 186 (which affirmed California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Native Am., 480 U.S. 202 (1987))
(agreeing that a tribe usually has a right to exclude non-Indi-
ans from its reservation, but "[f]ederal law enforcement of-
ficers have the capability to respond to violations of [federal
laws that implicate tribal lands] on Native American reserva-
tions.").
106 See Southland Royalty Co., 715 F.2d at 488 (which af-
firmed Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137) ("The tribe has a power to
tax which derives from 'the tribe's general authority, as sover-
eign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction.'").
But see Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 184
("Although revenue from the [tribal] mill is critical to the
tribal government, application of the [OSHA] Act does not
touch on the Tribe's 'exclusive rights of self-governance in
purely intramural matters,"' because the mill employs non-
Indians and sells its produce in interstate commerce.).
107 Couer d'Alene established the groundwork of this test,
asserting that "because the Farm employs non-Indians as well
as Indians, and because it is in virtually every respect a nor-
mal commercial farming enterprise, we believe that its opera-
tion free of federal health and safety regulations is 'neither
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relates to matters that threaten the political integ-
rity, the economic security, or the health or wel-
fare of the tribe in three ways. First, advanced tele-
communications services are essential to the fu-
ture economic and political growth of tribes. 1" 8
Emissions would be confined to the reservation
and non-Indians would not be subject to tribal tel-
ecommunication regulations. This argument
would likely fail because of the economic security
exception. This exception has been construed as
inapplicable to activities that involve the open
market; advanced telecommunications services
would further tribal economic growth by facilitat-
ing the linkage between tribes and the open mar-
ket. '19
Second, tribes could argue that telecommunica-
tions services, which enable tribal members to ef-
fectively communicate with one another, are part
of "domestic relations."' " However, "domestic re-
lations" probably do not include telecommunica-
tions. The few cases that discuss "domestic rela-
tions" involve issues such as adultery.' I1 Further-
more, if tribal UWB emissions have any affect on
non-Indians (such as those who live on the reser-
vation, but on non-Indian fee lands), then tele-
profoundly intramural ... nor essential to self-government.'"
Coeur d/Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (quoting United States v. Far-
ris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980)). The Second Circuit
formalized the Coeur d'Alene logic into a "mosaic test" of
whether a matter is purely intramural; factors include: (i) the
nature of work (ii) whether the tribe employs non-Indians,
and (iii) whether the activity operates in interstate com-
merce. Reich, 95 F.3d at 181 ("These separate tiles-the na-
ture of MSG's work, its employment of non-Indians, and the
construction work on a hotel and casino that operates in in-
terstate commerce-when viewed as a whole, result in a mo-
saic that is distinctly inconsistent with the portrait of an In-
dian tribe exercising exclusive rights of self-governance in
purely intramural matters."). See Smart, 868 F.2d at 935-36
(Because the insurer was a non-Indian and "ERISA does not
broadly and completely define the employment relationship
... [it] merely imposes beneficiary protection while in no
way limiting the way in which the Tribe governs intramural
matters." So, the statute of general applicability is applicable
to tribes and tribal employers.); Occupational Safety & Health
Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 184 (employing the Second Circuit mo-
saic test and noting that "[t]he mill employs a significant
number of non-Native Americans and sells virtually all of its
finished product to non-Native Americans through channels
of interstate commerce."); Florida Paraplegic Ass'n, 166 F.3d at
1129 ("The Miccosukee Tribe's restaurant and gaming facil-
ity is a commercial enterprise open to non-Indians from
which the Tribe intends to profit. The business does not re-
late to the governmental functions of the Tribe, nor does it
operate exclusively within the domain of the Tribe and its
members. In fact, it is precisely the sort of facility within 'the
array of establishments . . . available to others who do not
currently have disabilities' that Congress intended to make
communications services would not be a pure "do-
mestic relations" activity.
Third, if general regulation of telecommunica-
tions services on tribal lands is not a "purely intra-
mural matter," tribes can argue that use of UWB
technology for government functions is a "purely
intramural matter."' 12 For example, a high-speed
wireless network involving the tribal courthouse,
council building, and town hall is necessary for ef-
fective governance and administration of justice.
It may be possible that a court will determine the
"intramural matter" exception applies to the de-
ployment of telecommunications services in tribal
government buildings.
(ii) Does the Federal Regulation of Tribal
Telecommunications Services Abrogate Tribal
Rights Guaranteed by Indian Treaties?
If a court does not conclude that telecommuni-
cations falls under the "self-governance in intra-
mural matters" exception, tribes can argue that
the application of the Communications Act to
tribes abrogates rights guaranteed by Indian trea-
ties. There are two types of treaty provisions that
'equal [ly] access [ible]' to disabled individuals through enact-
ment of Title III of the ADA."; Farris, 624 F.2d at 893 (gam-
bling operations conducted on Indian trust land that are of
"the large-scale professional gambling involved here .. . is
neither profoundly intramural (the casinos' clientele was
largely non-Indian) nor essential to self-government"). But see
Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 249 (refusing to apply "general appli-
cability" rule to Age Discrimination in Employment Act
where employment relationship was between Indian tribe
employer and Indian applicant, because "the tribe's specific
right of self-government would be affected.").
118 See supra, Part II.
'09 See, e.g., Occupational Safety &Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d
at 184 ("Although revenue from the [tribal] mill is critical to
the tribal government, application of the [OSHA] Act does
not touch on the Tribe's "exclusive rights of self-governance
in purely intramural matters," because the mill employs non-
Indians and sells its produce in interstate commerce.); See
also Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic
Development: What Challenges Lie Ahead for Tribal Nations as They
Continue to Strive for Economic Diversity?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'V 441, 460 (2002) (noting that "any operations that may
promote a tribe's economic growth by participating in open
markets would clearly be too broad.").
I I' See, e.g., Quiver, 241 U.S. at 603-05 (holding that
adultery committed by one Indian with another Indian on an
Indian reservation is domestic relations, and generally, do-
mnestic relations are the "relations of the Indians among
themselves-the conduct of one toward another.").
I I I See Id.
112 See also Coeur dAlene, 751 F.2d at 1115 (purely intra-
mural matters are those involving the political or economic
viability of a tribe or a tribe's "health or wefare.").
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could be used to prove that the Communications
Act abrogates treaty rights. First, some tribes have
agreements with the federal government that give
them the right to exclude non-Indians from tribal
lands. It is arguable that such a treaty prevents
FCC officials from inspecting tribal lands and en-
forcing regulatory violations. Second, some tribes
have been granted a right to remain forever inde-
pendent of any United States state, territory or
possession. This treaty right may exempt tribes
from federal statutes (such as the Communica-
tions Act) that regulate "states, territories, or pos-
sessions." A court is likely to reject these argu-
ments, because treaties do not specifically grant
tribes the right to regulate telecommunications
services." 3
2. The Tenth Circuit's Pueblo of San Juan Rule
of Tribal Legislative Sovereignty
NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,114 a recently de-
cided Tenth Circuit case, stands for the tribe-
friendly proposition that when congressional in-
tent underlying a federal statute is uncertain and
a tribal council enacts legislation "regulating eco-
nomic activity involving its own members within
its own territory,"' 1 5 then the tribal law trumps
any contrary provisions of the generally applicable
federal statute." 6 In the ruling that National La-
bor Relations Act did not prevent the Pueblo tri-
bal council from enacting a "right-to-work law,"
113 See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v.
Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding federal tax stat-
utes applied to the tribe when a treaty with a general exclu-
sion clause contained no specific exemption language for
taxes).
114 276 F.3d at 1186 (10th Cir. 2002).
115 Id. at 1200.
116 Id. at 1198-2000.
117 Id. at 1196 (citing Menion, 455 U.S. at 148 n.14).
118 Id. at 1199.
'1 Id. at 1191 (emphasis added). If this limitation were
read broadly, a tribe that enacts legislation that permits a
UWB wireless network for Internet access violates "precisely"
Part 15 of the FCC's Rules. However, a more literal reading
would show that the 1996 Act itself does not specifically out-
law UWB, so it can be legalized for tribal members on the
tribal reservation by a tribal statute.
120 See id. at 1204 (Murphy,J., dissenting) ("[T]he major-
ity offers no logical, precedential, or authoritative support for
the proposition that a tribe's sovereign power to enact general
legislation is afforded more protection than any other aspect
of its sovereignty.") (emphasis in original). Dissenting Judge
Murphy observed that the Tenth Circuit in Nero, had applied
the Tuscarora Rule to determine whether a silent general stat-
ute divested the tribe of inherent sovereignty. Id. Judge Mur-
the court concluded that "[s] ilence is not suffi-
cient to establish congressional intent to strip In-
dian tribes of their retained inherent authority to
govern their own territory .... The correct pre-
sumption is that silence does not work a divesti-
ture of tribal power."' 1 7 The court distinguished
its holding from the Tuscarora genealogy by stat-
ing that its decision was motivated by the fact that
the tribe was exercising its authority as a sovereign
rather than in a proprietary capacity such as that
of an employer or landowner.' 8
Accordingly, tribes can argue that the regula-
tion of telecommunications services is an exercise
of its authority as a sovereign rather than in a pro-
prietary capacity; therefore, a court should pre-
sume that sovereignty has not been abrogated
under Pueblo of San Juan. However, there are sev-
eral reasons why a court may reject this argument.
First, the Pueblo court stated that "[t] he sugges-
tion that tribes . . . might 'enact ordinances al-
lowing precisely what generally applicable federal
law prohibits' finds no support. . . ," yet it offered
no standard for determining when a tribal ordi-
nance allows "precisely" what the general federal
statute prohibits. 1 9 Second, the concurring and
dissenting opinions in Pueblo of San Juan heavily
criticized the property/sovereignty dichotomy as
unworkable. 20 Third, the holding in Pueblo of San
Juan can be limited based on the facts of the
case.12 ' Finally, the Supreme Court frequently re-
jects novel opinions on tribal sovereignty originat-
phy also feared that the Pueblo Rule will decimate Congress's
ability to regulate Indian tribes through statutes of general
applicability. Id. He cited opinions from several other circuit
courts appearing to hold to the contrary, and concluded:
By holding that Congress can never implicitly divest
tribes of their power to enact laws that conflict with gen-
erally applicable federal statutes, the majority effectively
bestows upon Indian tribes sovereign powers far greater
than those possessed even by the states. As a result of the
majority opinion, tribes will now have unfettered power
to enact ordinances that directly conflict with any fed-
eral statute of general application. For example, the
Pueblo ... could [ ] enact legislation declaring its mem-
bers to be exempt from all federal tax laws. Such an or-
dinance would effectively preempt the application of all
federal tax laws until Congress remedied the situation by
expressly including Indian tribes within the reach of the
federal tax laws. This certainly cannot be the rule.
Id. at 1205.
121 The first and most obvious limiting factor is that
states and territories were statutorily enabled to enact similar
legislation to the Pueblo of San Juan. It is perhaps the per-
missibility of comparable state legislation that allowed the
Pueblo court to so easily construct its holding and to state,
"[like states and territories, the Pueblo has a strong interest as a
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ing in the Tenth Circuit. 122 Assuming that Pueblo
of San Juan is able to withstand all of these objec-
tions, its rule implies that the FCC might not be
able to prohibit the passage of a tribal ordinance
authorizing UWB telecommunications network
on a reservation. .2 3
iii. "The Gloss ": If Congress Has Not Abrogated
Tribal Sovereignty, Can Sovereignty Be
Divested By a Tribe's Failure To Assert It?
If a court finds that Congress has not abrogated
tribal sovereignty, the Commission might argue
that a "gloss" has been established by the contin-
ued FCC regulation of telecommunications ser-
vices on tribal lands. In other words, because the
Commission has regulated telecommunications
services on tribal lands for many years, tribal sov-
ereignty has been divested.' 24 This argument
could be effectively rebutted. First, failure to chal-
lenge federal regulation does not erode tribal sov-
ereignty. 125 Second, even if a "gloss" has been es-
tablished to allow the FCC to regulate telecommu-
nications services on tribal lands, tribes are assert-
sovereign in regulating economic activity involving its own
members within its own territory, and it therefore may enact
laws governing such activity." Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
To further buttress the insight that its broad grant of inher-
ent legislative sovereign authority was not so broad, the
Pueblo court also stated, "[t] here is [ ] no showing before us
that the Pueblo's right-to-work ordinance is a.kind of law that
a state or territory might not be permitted to enact and en-
force." Id. Second, when distinguishing Phillips Petroleum
from the case before it, the Court observed that "the facts
differ significantly between [Phillips Petroleum] and the in-
stant [case]. There, the statute gave delegated authority to
the Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate regula-
tions governing underground injection, which threatened to
pollute groundwater and endanger the nation's drinking
water supply." Id. at 1199. To justify the holding, the court
could have observed that Phillips Petroleum involved the tribe's
proprietary, rather than its sovereign, interest. While the Phil-
lips Petroleum comment may be in dictum, it still suggests that
a tribal statute that conflicts with a federal ordinance of wide-
spread importance will be struck down as invalid.
122 The Tenth Circuit's last attempt to extend tribes' in-
herent sovereignty came in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000), which was overturned by the
Supreme Court in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645 (2001).
123 The tribal law would have to be carefully and nar-
rowly construed to come within the scope of tribal authority
offered by Pueblo of San Juan. In particular, only tribal mem-
bers could use UWB, and because the autonomy granted by
the Tenth Circuit is closely linked to tribal sovereignty, the
law should err on the side of conservatism by permitting
UWB use only for tribal government institutions.
124 In advancing this argument, the Commission could
ing their sovereignty over the regulation of new
technologies such as UWB. Accordingly, it would
be unjust to deny tribes the benefit of their sover-
eignty over novel forms of telecommunications
services because they failed to assert control over
other communications services, such as basic tele-
phone service, nearly a century ago.
iv. The Scope of Tribal Regulatory Authority and
the Montana Limitation
If a court holds that tribes have sovereignty to
regulate UWB, the FCC can argue that tribes only
have the authority to allow UWB emissions on In-
dian land. The emissions cannot "leak" onto non-
Indian lands. As a direct result of the General Al-
lotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act),' 126 many Indian
reservations are a jurisdictional quagmire, a
checkerboard of tribal and federal jurisdiction
over trust lands and state jurisdiction over non-In-
dian fee lands. 27 In Montana v. United States,'2 8
the Supreme Court held that on Indian-country
fee lands, 12 ' the general rule is that "absent a dif-
ferent congressional direction, Indian tribes lack
draw a parallel to the "gloss" argument used in separation of
powers jurisprudence. In Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter
noted "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pur-
stied to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power'
vested in the President ..... See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952).
125 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 ("[U]ntil Congress acts, the
tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status."); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy, 599
F.2d 1061, 1066 (fst Cir. 1979) ("The mere passage of time
with its erosion of the full exercise of the sovereign powers of
a tribal organization cannot constitute such an implicit di-
vestiture.").
126 General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), 24 Stat.
388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§331-58 (1994)).
127 See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment,
27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 83 (1995). The Allotment Era officially
ended when Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§461-79 (1994).
128 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981) (considering the sources
and scope of the power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunt-
ing and fishing by non-Indians on lands inside reservation
boundaries that were owned in fee simple by non-Indians). It
should be noted that Montana analysis does not apply to reg-
ulations on tribal lands. See, e.g., Allstate Indem. Co v. Stump,
191 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Montana rule
governs only disputes arising on non-Indian fee land, not dis-
putes on tribal land; otherwise, the Strate Court's analysis of
why a state highway on tribal land was equivalent to non-tri-
bal land would have been unnecessary.").
129 Strate, 520 U.S. at 446 ("The term 'non-Indian fee
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civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers
on non-Indian land within a reservation."I30 Mon-
tana, however, excluded from this general princi-
ple a tribe's regulation of the activities of non-
members who (1) "enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members";1 ' or (2)
"threaten[ ] or [have] some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe." 13 2
lands' ... refers to reservation land acquired in fee simple by
non-Indian owners.").
130 Id.
131 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
132 Id. at 566. In light of recent Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, there might be a third, implicit
Montana exception that is forming. This exception recog-
nizes that "tribes have inherent sovereignty over water quality
management and habitat protection in reservation waters."
H. Scott Althouse, Idaho Nibbles at Montana: Carving Out a
Third Exception for Tribal Jurisdiction Over Environmental & Nat-
ural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 721, 766 (2001). The
rationale underlying this possible exception is that the Su-
preme Court in its line of precedent since Montana was im-
properly fixated on property interests as a bright line to de-
termine whether tribes simply have no inherent sovereignty
claim to regulate behavior in a certain area, or instead might
have inherent sovereignty rights to control certain activities,
such as water or air quality management. The challenges to
the proprietary bright line test established by the Supreme
Court in Montana, finds support in the Tenth Circuit's recent
decision, Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1198-99 ("Proprie-
tary interests and sovereign interests are separate ... a gov-
ernment may exercise sovereign authority over land it does
not own."). Indeed, the Court itself has struggled to identify
the correct scope of inherent sovereignty within its property-
based analysis; the quintessential example of this is usufructu-
ary rights (i.e. off-reservation hunting and fishing control).
To allow Indians this sovereign right, the Court has deemed
that Indian property rights include "profits a prendre," re-
gardless of whether a tribe bargained for such rights in a
treaty. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). But see, Idaho v. United States,
533 U.S. 262 (2001) (showing the Supreme Court also ap-
pears to be backtracking on its property-based Montana logic
and moving in yet another direction).
13 See Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655 (finding that
"a nonmember's actual or potential receipt of tribal police,
fire, and medical services," or "a person's status as a licensed
Indian trader" do not qualify a person to have entered into a
"consensual relationships with a tribe," per the first Montana
exception); Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (holding that there was no
tribal jurisdiction although the construction company "was
engaged in subcontract work on the Reservation, and there-
fore had a 'consensual relationship' with the Tribes, '[the
plaintiff driver] was not a party to the subcontract, and the
Tribes were strangers to the [car] accident."') (quoting A-1
Contractors, 76 F.3d at 940); Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v.
Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000) ("An ad valorem
tax on the value of utility property is not a tax on the activi-
ties of a nonmember, but is instead a tax on the value of
property.") Therefore, this is outside the first Montana excep-
tion. See also Burlington N. R.R. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059,
1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "right-of-way created by
Courts have construed the first exception nar-
rowly and it is not likely to be of much use in over-
coming a non-tribal resident's challenge to a tri-
bal UWB telecommunications network. 133 The
second exception, which has primarily been dis-
cussed by the Ninth Circuit, likewise has been
construed narrowly.' 3 4 The Supreme Court has
also taken a limited view of the matter, 135 and has
concluded that "[t]he [second Montana] excep-
congressional grant is a transfer of a property interest that
does not create a continuing consensual relationship be-
tween a tribe and the grantee."); Yellowstone County v.
Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a stat-
ute which gave the state portions of tribal land in exchange
for a guarantee that tribal children could attend state public
schools is not "a consensual commercial agreement," but is
instead "a legislative directive from Congress."). But see In re
Western Wireless Corporation: Petition for Designation as an
Eligible Telecommunications Carrier for the Pine Ridge Res-
ervation in South Dakota, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16
FCC Rcd. 18,145, paras. 15-16 (2001) (finding that because a
wireless carrier had a consensual relationship with the Tribe,
the first Montana exception provided the tribe with the sover-
eignty to regulate).
134 In subsequent cases, this exception has occasionally
provided tribes with greater inroads to achieving inherent
sovereignty. See, e.g., Montana, 137 F.3d at 1141 (holding that
for a lake that lies on both non-Indian and Indian-owned res-
ervation lands, the Clean Water Act defers regulation to the
tribe because "'[a] water system is a unitary resource. The
actions of one user have an immediate and direct effect on
other users."' (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Wal-
ton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (1981)). To come within the second
Montana exception, the court ruled that the potential im-
pacts of regulated activities (here, the impairment of lake wa-
ters) on the tribe must be "serious and substantial."). Id. at
1140-41. However, tribal success has generally been re-
stricted to tribal assertions of zoning authority over fee lands.
See, e.g., Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Cmty. v.
Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (holding Pinoleville Rancheria could impose a one-
year moratorium on development, including non-Indian fee
lands); Coleville Confederated Tribes v. Cavenham Forest In-
dus., 14 Indian L. Rep. 6043 (Colville Tr. Ct. 1987) (uphold-
ing tribal zoning of non-Indian fee lands); Knight v. Sho-
shone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes of Wind River Reservation,
670 F.2d 900, 903-04 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding tribal zoning
ordinance applies to nonmember reservation residents);
Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210, 1220-21 (9th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Pease, 96 F.3d at 1176-77 and Strate, 520
U.S. at 458) (the nonmember's impact on a tribe be "demon-
strably serious," or "trench unduly on tribal self-govern-
ment.").
135 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (stating that the existence of
tribal ownership is not alone enough to support regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers. "The ownership status land
... is only one factor to consider in determining whether
regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 'necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal rela-
tions.' It may sometimes be a dispositive factor."); Atkinson
Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 657 (finding that "operation of a ho-
tel on non-Indian fee land" is not a second exemption from
Montana.); Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (observing that forcing "[a
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tion is only triggered by nonmember conduct that
threatens the Indian tribe; it does not broadly per-
mit the exercise of civil authority wherever it
might be considered 'necessary' to self-govern-
ment." 13 6 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
held that a high ratio of tribal to non-member res-
ervation acreage will NOT affect the Montana anal-
ysis.' 37 Thus, if there are even small parcels of
non-Indian land on the reservation and tribal
UWB telecommunications network causes inter-
ference, the FCC may be able to enjoin tribes
from broadcast.
To avoid the Montana pitfalls when implement-
ing a UWB telecommunications network, a model
tribal reservation should contain no non-tribal re-
sidents living on non-Indian fee lands. But even
those tribes with non-tribal residents may well be
able to satisfy the Montana concerns in two ways.
First, tribes can argue that there will be no inter-
ference to non-Indian lands. Second, even if tribal
emissions did leak onto non-Indian reservation
lands, tribes could argue that Montana's "political
and economic" exception is applicable: UWB tele-
communications networks are necessary to the
continued "economic security" of the tribe. 1 38
non-Indian owned corporation working on the reservation]
and [a negligent non-Indian driver employed by the corpora-
tion who caused an accident with an Indian driver] to defend
against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an
unfamiliar court is not crucial to 'the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the [Three Af-
filiated Tribes]'") (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566); Mon-
tana, 450 U.S. at 564-65 ("Since regulation of hunting and
fishing by nonmembers of a tribe on lands no longer owned
by the tribe bears no clear relationship to tribal self-govern-
ment or internal relations, the general principles of retained
inherent sovereignty did not [empower] the [ ] Tribe.").
136 Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 657 n.12 (emphasis
in original).
137 See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding the tribe au-
thorized to zone a small, non-Indian parcel of land in the
middle of a closed, largely uninhabited 800,000 acre tribal
land). But Atkinson Trading rejected that Brendale stood for
the general proposition that tribes can regulate non-mem-
bers whenever the parcel of non-Indian land is "miniscule in
relation to the surrounding tribal land." Atkinson Trading Co.,
532 U.S. at 657. The Atkinson Trading Court concluded that
"[i]rrespective of the percentage of non-Indian fee land
within a reservation, Montana's second exception grants In-
dian tribes nothing beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations." Id. at 658.
(citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at
564)).
138 Beyond the economic resource arguments provided
herein, tribes might contend that UWB installation that in-
B. Does the FCC Have a Duty To Exempt Tribes
From UWB Regulation Under the Trust Doctrine?
If a court holds that tribal sovereignty is not a
bar to FCC regulation, tribes can alternatively ar-
gue that the Commission has a duty to exempt
tribes from restrictions on UWB telecommunica-
tions networks. In ruling on this argument, a
court will determine: (1) if the Commission has a
limited or fiduciary duty to Indian tribes; (2) the
scope of that duty; and (3) whether the Commis-
sion has breached that duty by applying UWB reg-
ulations to tribes. 139
i. Does the Commission Have a Limited Duty or a
Fiduciary Duty?
The Supreme Court has recognized the "undis-
puted existence of a general trust relationship be-
tween the United States and the Indian peo-
ple." 4 ) The trust relationship extends "not only
to Indian tribes as governmental units, but to tri-
bal members living collectively or individually, on
or off the reservation."' 4 1
In analyzing trust claims, courts distinguish be-
tween duties arising from a general or limited,
trust and a fiduciary trust. The Supreme Court
terference with tribal telecommunications networks by non-
Indians from cellular telephone transmissions are encroach-
ing on a "unitary resource" of the tribe, and that tribes may
regulate their resource as they see fit. See Montana, 137 F.3d
at .1141 (holding that exclusive tribal regulation of a lake ly-
ing on both Indian and non-Indian land was permitted and
that Indian regulation was integral to the tribe's economic
future because "'[a] water system is a unitary resource. The
actions of one user have an immediate and direct effect on
other users'") (quoting Coleville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d
at 52; Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. 3025
(W.D. Wash. 1982) (upholding tribe's authority to require
non-Indian reservation residents to connect to the tribal gov-
ernment's sewer system).
1319 See generally Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy
Corp, 728 F.2d 1555, 1563-73 (10th Cir. 1984) (SeymourJ.,
dissenting).
140 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)
(which affirmed Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286, 296 (1942) [hereinafter Mitchell II]; United States v.
Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987) (stating
that the law is "well established that the Government in its
dealings with Indian tribal property acts in a fiduciary capac-
ity."); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (Marshall, CJ.) (drawing
upon the concept of a protectorate or alliance relationship
founded upon agreement by treaty and describing Indian
tribes as "domestic dependent nations" which "look to [the
U.S.] government for protection.").
141 Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. HUD, 675 F.
Supp. 497, 535 (D. Minn. 1987).
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clarified this distinction in the Mitchell cases. 142
The cases involve tribal claims for monetary dam-
ages for the government's mismanagement of for-
est resources.1 43 In Mitchell I, the Court held that
the General Allotment Act, which provided that
the United States would hold land "in trust" for
Indian allottees, created only a limited or general
trust relationship. 44 The Court remanded the
case and requested more specific standards to
support fiduciary duties. 45 In Mitchell II, the
Court held that (1) the identified statutes and
regulations directly supported the existence of a
fiduciary relationship; 146 and (2) the govern-
ment's "elaborate control over forests and prop-
erty belonging to Indians" gave rise to a fiduciary
relationship. 14 7
Under Mitchell I, courts first evaluate the rele-
vant statutes and regulations to determine if a fi-
duciary trust relationship exists.148 The Tenth Cir-
cuit established a test for making this determina-
tion in ficarilla Apache v. Supron Energy Corpora-
tion: 149
[N]o particular words or phrases are critical to the find-
ing of a trust relationship. "The use of the word 'trus-
tee' is not absolutely essential to the finding of a trust
relationship when it is otherwise clear that Congress in-
tended a trust relationship to exist." Rather, the test is
142 See generally United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535
(1980) [hereinafter Mitchell 1] and Mitchell I, 463 U.S. at 206.
143 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 207.
144 Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 546. Because the General Allot-
ment Act did not establish a fiduciary responsibility for man-
agement of allotted forest lands, the Court could not impose
any duties for purposes of monetary damages. Id.
145 Id. at 546.
146 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
147 Id. at 225.
148 Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 190-91 (1987)
(holding that a fiduciary obligation existed with respect to
the management of oil and gas leases when the statutory lan-
guage included: "to fulfill the trust responsibility of the
United States for the administration of Indian oil and gas re-
sources"; "to effectively utilize the capabilities of the States
and Indian tribes in developing and maintaining an efficient
and effective Federal royalty management system"; and "the
Secretary should aggressively carry out his trust responsibility
in the administration of Indian oil and gas"); Cobell v. Bab-
bit, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that a fiduciary
relationship existed when Congress created the Individual
Indian Money Trust.); Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994,
998 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that certain federal statutes
providing for the payment of interest on tribal trust funds
held by the United States, "in conjunction with the govern-
ment's fiduciary duty to Native American tribes, give the
plaintiffs a substantive right to damages, including interest"
for breach of that duty) (citing Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224-
26); Navajo Nation v. Hodel, 645 F. Stipp. 825, 827-30 (D.
Ariz. 1986) (holding that the use of the terms "special rela-
tionship" and "trustee" and the description of the Indian
whether "the relevant statutory and regulatory provi-
sions [contain] an enumeration of duties which would
justify a conclusion that Congress intended the Secre-
tary to be a trustee." 
15
In Mitchell II, the statute expressly mandated
that sales of timber from Indian trust lands be
based upon the Secretary's consideration of "the
needs and best interests of the Indian owner and
his heirs" and that proceeds from such sales be
paid to owners "or disposed of for their bene-
fit."'151 In promulgating regulations under the
General Allotment Act, the government recog-
nized its duties in "managing the Indian forests so
as to obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians
consistent with [the] proper protection and im-
provement of the forests."' 152 Thus, the Court held
that the government has "expressed a firm desire
that the Tribe should retain the benefits derived
from the harvesting and sale of reservation tim-
ber."153 In ficarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy
Corp., the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 pro-
vided detailed responsibilities for the Secretary in
managing leases under the General Allotment
Act.' 54 The Tenth Circuit held that "the evident
purpose of the statute was to ensure that Indian
tribes receive the maximum benefit from mineral
children as a "resource" for which Congress has "assumed the
responsibility [of] protection and preservation" in the Indian
Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") suggests that Congress has as-
sumed a fiduciary relationship.); Blue Legs v. United States,
867 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that Con-
gress intended the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") and In-
dian Health Service to have fiduciary responsibilities under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.); Grey v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285, 293 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 281
(Fed. Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 10570 (refusing to find
a fiduciary trust relationship where plaintiff could not point
to a statute or regulation that created a duty on behalf of the
government that would require the government to manage
water delivery to and irrigation of individual farm allot-
ments.); Osage Tribal Council v. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d
1174, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding no fiduciary rela-
tionship when the Secretary of Labor brought an action
against a Tribal Council under the Safe Drinker Water Act's
whistle blower provisions, because the Secretary was simply
carrying out his duties with respect to Congress' mandate on
safe drinking water and the Council could not identify any
specific statutory obligation.); Wheeler v. Dep't of the Inte-
rior, 811 F.2d 549, 552 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding no fiduciary
duty for the federal government to intervene in Tribal elec-
tion disputes); Nero, 892 F.2d at 1457.
149. ficarilla Apache, 728 F.2d at 1563-73.
150 Id. at 1564 (citing Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d
1332, 1338 (10th Cir. 1979)) (internal citations omitted).
151 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 224-25.
154 ficarilla Apache, 728 F.2d at 1565.
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deposits on their lands through leasing."'155 This
interpretation is supported by legislative history of
the Indian Mineral Leasing Act and extensive reg-
ulations promulgated by the Department of the
Interior. 56 Because the statutes and regulations
contained "such an explicit and detailed enumer-
ation of duties," it is clear that Congress intended
a fiduciary trust relationship. 15 7
If a statute is not sufficiently detailed to support
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, courts
can find a fiduciary relationship when the federal
government has control or supervision over tribal
monies or properties. 158 Some courts have held
that there is a fiduciary duty even when the gov-
ernment has less than complete management
control of the resources. 159
The Commission should concede that at least a
general trust relationship exists between the Com-
mission and Indian tribes. In its Statement of Policy,
the Commission maintains that it recognizes its
own "general trust relationship with, and respon-
sibility to, federally recognized Indian Tribes."' 1"
The Commission will most likely contest the exis-
tence of a fiduciary relationship with Indian
tribes.
Tribes can make two arguments to support a
conclusion of fiduciary duty with the Commission.
First, the 1996 Act, its legislative history and FCC
regulations suggest the Commission has a fiduci-
ary duty with respect to tribes. Admittedly, the
1996 Act does not mention the words "trust,"
"best interests," or Indians." However, the Univer-
sal Service provisions of the 1996 Act can be inter-
preted to imply a duty to ensure telecommunica-
tions regulations benefit Indian tribes.'"' This in-
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 225 ("[A] fiduciary relationship
necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elabo-
rate control over forests and property belonging to Indians.
... [Where] the Federal Government takes on or has control
or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary
relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or
properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even
though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or under-
lying statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust
fund, or a trust or fiduciary connection." (citing Navajo Tribe
of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (1980)). See
Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (not-
ing that "courts correctly recognize a trust relationship even
where it is not explicitly laid out by statute").
59 Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554, 1558-62 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that the statutes and regulations gov-
erning commercial leasing of Indian lands need not give the
terpretation is supported by the 1996 Act's legisla-
tive history.'62 Further, the FCC's Statement of Pol-
icy notes that the Commission will act "in accor-
dance with the federal government's trust respon-
sibility"'6 3 and the goals and principles outlined
in the policy can be understood as committing
the Commission to act in the best interests of the
tribes. The detailed rules adopted by the Commis-
sion to promote tribal telecommunications ser-
vices are part of the agency's "federal trust respon-
sibility to ensure a standard of livability for mem-
bers of Indian tribes on tribal lands."'164
Second, if the statute and regulations are not
sufficiently specific, the Commission's "control or
supervision" over "tribal ... propert[y]" gives rise
to a fiduciary relationship. 165 Just as the govern-
ment assumed elaborate control over forests and
property belonging to Indians in Mitchell II, the
FCC has long sought to establish elaborate con-
trol over physical telecommunications infrastruc-
ture on tribal lands and the use of frequency spec-
trum on tribal lands. 16
6
The Commission can probably convince a court
that a fiduciary relationship does not exist. First,
the Commission may argue that spectrum is not a
resource that can be treated as a trust corpus. 167 In
Grey v. United States, the court held that water is
not a trust corpus, because it is not a source of
wealth that must be managed to maximize in-
come that is distributed as profits. 1 68 The Com-
mission may also argue that spectrum use does
not produce income that can be disbursed as
profits. Tribes can respond to these arguments by
pointing to cases that undermine Grey'16, and ar-
guing that spectrum is a limited resource that
government "ongoing management responsibility over the
day-to-day administration of commercial leases," in order to
satisfy the Mitchell I1 "control or supervision" test.).
166 Statement of Policy, supra note 35, at para. 4.
161 See e.g., ficarilla Apache, 728 F.2d at 1564-65 ("[1]t [is]
evident that the purpose of the statute was to ensure that the
Indian tribes receive the maximum benefit.").
162 The legislative history contains strong language sup-
porting the duty to increase telecommunications on tribal
lands. See supra note 83.
1'6s See Statement of Policy, supra note 35.
164 Universal Services Order, supra note 37, para. 23.
1'.5 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
16(6 See supra Part V.
167 In order for a common-law trust to exist, there must
be "a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian
allotees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands and
funds)." Mitchell 1, 463 U.S. at 225.
168 See Grey, 21 Cl. Ct. at 293.
16(9 See, e.g., Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23
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could generate income for tribes. Even if tribes
can effectively rebut these arguments, they will
have difficult, responding to the Commission's
other arguments.
Second, the Commission can argue that even if
Congress did intend to impose an obligation to
increase telephone penetration rates on tribal
lands, Congress did not intend to create a fiduci-
ary relationship between the Commission and In-
dian tribes. The Communications Act does not
mention the words "trust" or "tribes." Mitchell
J,170 ficarilla Apache,1 7 1 and other cases finding a
fiduciary relationship can be distinguished, be-
cause they generally involve agencies that special-
ize in Indian affairs and involve statutes that list
specific responsibilities such as the management
of Indian trust accounts, the distribution of gov-
ernment resources to tribes or the management
of natural resources on tribal lands. The Commis-
sion can cite to cases where the courts have found
no fiduciary duty even though a statute imposed
more specific obligations than the Communica-
tions Act.172
Third, the Commission can argue that the gen-
Cl. Ct. 417, 423-27 (1991) (holding that water rights can be a
trust corpus).
170 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 206.
171 Jicarilla Apache, 728 F.2d at 1555.
172 See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United
States, 249 F.3d 1364, 1372-77 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the follow-
ing statutes and regulations do not impose fiduciary obliga-
tions: the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA") (re-
quiring federal agencies to manage and maintain historic
properties under their control); the Historic Sites, Buildings,
Objects and Antiquities Act of 1935, (requiring the Secretary
of the Interior to "restore, reconstruct, rehabilitate, preserve
and maintain" any historic or prehistoric buildings or prop-
erty); Title XI of the Education Amendments Act of 1978 (re-
quiring the Secretary of the Interior to bring "all schools,
dormitories, and other facilities" operated by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs "into compliance with all applicable Federal,
tribal, or State health and safety standards"); the Improving
America's School's Act of 1994 (requiring federal govern-
ment to "maintain all school and residential facilities to meet
appropriate Tribal, State or Federal safety, health and child
care standards"); 25 U.S.C. §177 (2000) (precluding convey-
ance of Native American lands without United States' ap-
proval); the American Indian Trust Fund Management Act of
1994 (requiring Special Trustee for Native Americans to cer-
tify that the Department of the Interior's budget requests to
Congress are adequate to "discharge, effectively and effi-
ciently, the Secretary's trust responsibilities" to Native Ameri-
cans)).
173 See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA,
161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Thus, although the
United States does owe a general trust responsibility to In-
dian tribes, unless there is a specific duty that has been
placed on the government with respect to Indians, this re-
eral regulation of tribal lands do not give rise to a
fiduciary duty. The "control or supervision" test in
Mitchell II applies to active management of Indian
funds or property such as leasing of resources lo-
cated on Indian resources or holding and distrib-
uting Indian funds-not generally applicable stat-
utes that regulate Indians. 73 For example, in
Osage Tribal Council v. Dep 't of Labor, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the language of the Safe Drinking
Water Act was sufficiently clear to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity, 74 and the Secretary of Labor
did not have a duty to abstain from suing a tribe
under the same Act.175
ii. What Is The Scope Of The FCC's Duty?
Once a court determines whether a limited or
fiduciary trust relationship exists, it must deter-
mine the scope of the trust-the specific duties
and standards by which to judge the government's
conduct. Although there are many cases discuss-
ing the scope of fiduciary duties (Indian trust ac-
counts, 1 76 distributing government resources to
tribes, 7 7 adequately representing Indian interests
sponsibility is discharged by the agency's compliance with
general regulations and statutes not specifically aimed at pro-
tecting Indian tribes.")
174 Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1184 ("[W]e affirm
the Secretary's determination that the Osage Tribal Council
is not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity in this case be-
cause the SDWA whistle blower provision explicitly abrogates
that immunity.").
175 Id. at 1183-84 (" [T] he Secretary was not carrying out
his duties with respect to administering Indian property or
funds, rather the Secretary was carrying out his duties with
respect to Congress' mandate on safe drinking water.").
176 See, e.g., Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v.
United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (al-
lowing recovery against government for mismanagement of
tribal trust funds); Lounder v. United States, 108 F.3d 896,
903 (8th Cir. 1997) ("We hold that by providing an unreason-
ably short time period to allow beneficiaries to apply for their
share of the fund and failing to provide beneficiaries with
adequate notice, the Secretary acted contrary to his common-
law obligations as trustee."); Red Lake Band of Chippewa In-
dians v. Barlow, 834 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th Cir. 1987) ("We
believe the Secretary must actively seek the best use of the
funds to ensure that they are in fact used 'for the benefit' of
the Band.").
177 See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195 (1993)
(holding that fiduciary duty could not limit the Service's dis-
cretion to reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of
beneficiaries to serving the broader class of all Indians na-
tionwide.); Hodel, 645 F. Supp. at 828 ("The court can discern
no practical alternative method by which the BIA can fulfill
its fiduciary duty to all Indian tribes and organizations under
the ICWA and Snyder Act .... The BIA cannot be expected
to know the needs of each applicant without input from the
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in litigation, 78 and managing natural resources
on tribal lands), 'l7 few cases discuss the scope of a
general duty.
If a fiduciary relationship exists, the duties are
broad and demanding.'"" The duties are prima-
rily defined by the relevant statutes and regula-
applicants. Nor can the BIA be expected to do independent
research into the circumstances and needs of each appli-
cant."); Busby Sch. of the N. Cheyenne Tribe v. United
States, 8 Cl. Ct. 596, 601 (Cl. Ct. 1985) (Indian Schools); St.
Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408,
1413 (D. Minn. 1983) (Indian housing); Eric v. HUD, 464 F.
Supp. 44, 49 (D. Alaska 1978) (holding that Bartlett Act, en-
acted to provide housing for Alaskan Natives, falls within the
trust doctrine); Little Earth of United Tribes, Inc. v. S. High
Non-Proft Hous. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 497, 535 (D. Minn.
1987) (agreeing that trust obligation imposes affirmative
duty upon HUD to act in best interests of American Indian
people).
178 See, e.g., Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d
1476, 1479-83 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that government
did not breach any duty when Attorney General failed to as-
sert the Tribes' claims in water rights litigation, because gov-
ernment undertook instream flow studies; discussed with the
Tribes their claim to off-reservation water rights; retained a
historian to determine if the treaty might be read as the
Tribes apparently viewed it; and actively sought the assistance
of the tribes and their experts.); Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, 23
Cl. Ct. at 419-20 (holding that the government had an obli-
gation to sue on behalf of Indians); Chemehuevi Indian
Tribe v. Wilson, 987 F. Supp. 804, 807-09 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(holding that that the United States had a mandatory duty to
represent the tribes because the tribes had no legal remedy
to bring the State to the bargaining table and obtain the ben-
efits of the IGRA.).
179 See, e.g., Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 226-27 (holding that
the statutes and regulations at issue could fairly be inter-
preted as mandating compensation by the government for
violations of its fiduciary responsibilities in the management
of Indian property); Jicaril Apache, 728 F.2d at 1569 (hold-
ing breach of fiduciary duty in mismanaging oil and gas
leases on Indian lands, because the Department of the Inte-
rior failed to apply the accounting method that yielded the
tribe the greatest royalties and failed to adequately monitor
development of the leases sufficiently to insure compliance
with the terms thereof); Confederation Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation of Or. v. United States, 248 F.3d 1365,
1371-76 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that BIA mismanaged In-
dian timber resources by including too much green timber in
the sale, serious errors in BIA's accounting procedures re-
sulted in an undercount of the actual amount harvested, and
trees were taken from areas that were not designated in the
timber contract); Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d
1325, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding the United States
breached its fiduciary duties to the tribe, since the United
States' actions were clearly in the mining company's interest
and contrary to the tribe's interest); Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 192
(rejecting the argument that the Government did not pay In-
dians as royalties on the basis of the highest market value for
the particular type of gas produced by the leases and stating
that Interior is "not required to go beyond directives and
leases which are consistent with the statutes and regula-
tions."); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56, 60-62 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (holding that the Department of the Interior and
tions. Where the statutes and regulations fail to
specify the precise nature of the trustee's duties,
common law fiduciary standards define the trus-
tee's responsibilities.' 8" Courts will likely turn to
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and other
secondary sources to establish standards to judge
HEW breached its duties pertaining to the installation of san-
itation and irrigation facilities); Northwest Sea Farms v.
United States Army Corps of Engineering, 931 F. Supp. 1515,
1524, n.15 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding Corps upheld its fi-
duciary duty to ensure that Lumni Nation's treaty fishing
rights are not abrogated or impinged absent an act of Con-
gress); Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Dep't of Interior, 47 F.3d
1032, 1040 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding the Secretary had vio-
lated his fiduciary duty in managing Indian mineral inter-
ests); Cheyenne-Araphaho Tribes v. United States, 966 F.2d
583, 590 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant secretary's
failure to consider market conditions prior to approving
lessee's request for a communitization agreement was an ar-
bitrary and capricious abuse of discretion).
18 Supreme Court decisions contain statements that the
trust obligation owed by the United States to the Indians
must be exercised according to the strictest fiduciary stan-
dards. See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973);
Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97. Although federal officials
retain a substantial amount of discretion, a Secretary cannot
"escape his role as trustee by donning the mantle of adminis-
trator" to claim the courts must defer to his expertise and
delegated authority. Jicarilla Apache, 728 F.2d at 1567; Cobell,
240 F.3d at 1099 ("When faced with several policy choices, an
administrator is generally allowed to select any reasonable
option. Yet this is not the case when acting as a fiduciary for
Indian beneficiaries as 'stricter standards apply to federal
agencies when administering Indian programs."') (citing Ji-
carilla Apache, 728 F.2d at 1567.).
181 Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 142 (1983)
("[W]here only a relationship between the government and
the tribe is involved, the law respecting obligations between a
trustee and a beneficiary in private litigation will in many, if
not all, respects, adequately describe the duty of the United
States."); Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296; Mason, 412 U.S. at
398; Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective
Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 14 (2001) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Trusts); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Con-
servation, 792 F.2d 782, 794 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he same
trust principles that govern the conduct of private fiducia-
ries" determine the scope of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's ("FERC") obligations to the Community.);
Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1099:
This does not mean that the failure to specify the precise
nature of the fiduciary obligation or to enumerate the
trustee's duties absolves the government of its responsi-
bilities. It is well understood that 'the extent of [a trus-
tee's] duties and powers is determined by the trust in-
strument and the rules of law which are applicable.' RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND OF TRUSTS) §201, at 442 (1959). It is
the nature of any instrument that establishes a trust rela-
tionship that many of the duties and powers are implied
herein. They arise from the nature of the relationship
established. While the government's obligations are
rooted in and outlined by the relevant statutes and trea-
ties, they are largely defined in traditional equitable
terms.
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government conduct.8 2
In contrast, the conduct of the government in a
general trust is not judged by private fiduciary
standards,' 18 3 and the government is not subject to
monetary damages.'8 4 Tribal claimants should be
eligible for equitable or declaratory relief when
there is a general trust relationship.' 8 - The duties
of the bare or limited trust are defined by the stat-
utes and regulations.1 6
iii. Has The FCC Breached Its Duty?
Assuming that a court finds a limited trust and
not a fiduciary trust, tribes can argue that the
scope of the Commission's duty is defined by the
FCC's Statement of Policyl1 7 and Executive Order
13175.188 Tribes may also argue that prohibiting
the use of UWVB on tribal lands breaches these du-
ties in three ways.
182 For example, in Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, the court
held that the government's duty was to "do all acts necessary
for the preservation of the trust res which would be per-
formed by a reasonably prudent man employing his own like
property for purposes similar to those of the trust." Fort
Mojave Indian Tribe, 23 Cl. Ct. at 426. See also Mason, 412 U.S.
at 398 (citing 2 A. Scott, Trusts 1408 (3d ed. 1976)). Fiduci-
ary duty includes the "exercise [of] such care and skill as a
man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his
own property."). White Mountain Apache Tribe, 249 F.3d at
1378-79 (using the standards from common law to hold that
the government has a fiduciary obligation to make appropri-
ate repairs to buildings and other properties).
183 Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 545; Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 75, 78 (1988) (citing Mon-
tana Bank v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 601, 613 (1985)) ("If the
source of substantive law establishes only a general trust rela-
tionship, the government's fiduciary obligations are not
those of a private trustee.").
184 Mitchelll, 445 U.S. at 544 (noting that allegations of a
general trust relationship with an Indian Tribe do not estab-
lish a "claim for money" within the meaning of the Tucker
Act).
185 The explanation for this statement is somewhat com-
plex. Under the Tucker Act, a claim for monetary damages
must be based on violations of the Constitution, statutes, reg-
ulations, treaties and executive orders. Thus, a claimant can-
not sue for monetary damages under the Tucker Act without
the existence of a fiduciary trust relationship derived from
specific statutory or regulatory language. However, a claim-
ant should be able to sue for equitable relief based on a gen-
eral trust relationship. See Kimberly T. Ellwager, Recent Devel-
opments: Money Damages For Breach of the Federal Indian Trust
Relationship After Mitchell II, 59 WAsri. L. REx. 675, 685 (1984)
(noting that a general trust relationship continues to provide
the basis for equitable relief after Mitchell); Mary Christina
Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1522 (1994).
It is crucial to note that the Mitchell cases are confined
to the Tucker Act context and the cases should have
only limited applicability to tribal claims for equitable or
First, the Commission has a duty to "consult
with Tribal governments prior to implementing
any regulatory action or policy that will signifi-
cantly or uniquely affect Tribal governments,
their land and resources."18 9 Tribes can contend
that prior to the issuance of UWB regulations on
February 14, 2002, the FCC had a duty to analyze
whether application of the regulations to Tribal
lands was appropriate. The restrictions on UWAJB
"significantly or uniquely" affect tribal govern-
ments and resources in several ways. The regula-
tion has a primafacie impact on tribal resources by
preventing tribes from using their spectrum in a
particular manner. Additionally, the regulations
have an impact on tribal governments by preclud-
ing tribal governments from using certain applica-
tions of TWB. For example, UWB technology
could be installed in government buildings and
used by government officials to provide much
declaratory relief under the APA or other statutes. Any
rippling effect of the Mitchell opinions to these other
contexts is unwarranted, as the holdings are very much
tied to the limitations expressed in the Tucker Acts,
which afford damages solely for violations of the Consti-
tution, statutes, regulations, treaties and executive or-
ders. Because common law claims are normally not ac-
tionable in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act, the
Court in the Mitchell cases was forced to derive the trust
obligation from specific statutory or regulatory lan-
guage. Federal district courts, on the other hand, have
broad authority to hear federal common law claims and
to grant equitable and declaratory relief for such claims.
Cf Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Barlow, 834 F.2d
1393, 1398-1400 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding a fiduciary relation-
ship is required before awarding equitable relief), modified on
other grounds, 846 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1988).
186 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216-17; Mitchell J, 445 U.S. at
542, 544 (noting that the trust is limited to the original pur-
pose for the statute, which is protecting Indian land from tax-
ation and involuntary alienation because of a failure to pay
taxes or debts); Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 229
Ct. Cl. 250, 256 (1981) (holding that the statutory language
of section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act discloses that
the trust is limited to ownership of, or rights in, real property
acquired by the United States, is not a fiduciary trust).
"[T] he trust established by section 5 of the Act imposes only
duty on the United States to hold the acquired Indian lands
so as to prevent continued alienation ... [s]ection 5 does
itself 'unambiguously impose' a fiduciary duty on the United
States to promote all assets or enterprises acquired by the Indi-
ans pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act." Hydaburg
Coop., 229 Ct. Cl. at 257.
187 See Statement of Policy, supra note 35.
188 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (superseding
Exec. Order No. 13,084, Consultation and Coordination with
Indian Tribal Governments, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14,
1998)) [hereinafter Tribal Executive Order].
189 See Statement of Policy, supra note 35 (outlining com-
mission duties).
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needed telecommunications services. Finally, the
regulations have an adverse impact on tribal re-
sources and tribal governments by preventing
tribes from realizing the economic, social and cul-
tural benefits of UWB deployment. '4
Second, the Commission has a duty to "remove
undue burdens that its decisions and actions
place on Tribes."t)I Tribes can contend that, the
regulations restricting UWB telecommunications
networks limit economic, governmental and cul-
tural development on tribal lands '92 and place an
"undue burden" on the Indian tribes.
Third, tribes can argue that the Commission
has a duty under the Tribal Executive Order to defer
to tribes when they elect to promulgate their own
regulatory scheme. The Tribal Executive Order
states that the federal government should "grant
Indian tribal governments the maximum adminis-
trative discretion possible" when enforcing regula-
tions. 19" The TribalExecutive Order further requires
that federal agencies "encourage Indian tribes to
develop their own policies to achieve program
objectives," "defer to Indian tribes to establish
standards," and "in determining whether to estab-
lish Federal standards, consult with tribal officials
as to the need for Federal standards and any alter-
natives that would limit the scope of Federal stan-
dards or otherwise preserve the prerogatives and
authority of Indian tribes."' 9 4 Because the tribe
has decided to exercise its sovereignty by develop-
ing its own policies and standards with regard to
UWB technology, the Commission has a duty to
defer to the tribal government.
190 See supra Part Ill for a discussion of the economic,
social and governmental benefits of UWB.
191 See Statement of Policy, supra note 35.
192 See supra Part Ill.
1 9 See Tribal Executive Order, supra note 188 at 67,249-50
(§3(b)).
194 Id. §3(c).
When undertaking to formulate and implement policies
that have tribal implications, agencies shall:
(1) encourage Indian tribes to develop their own poli-
cies to achieve program objectives;
(2) where possible, defer to Indian tribes to establish
standards; and
(3) in determining whether to establish Federal stan-
dards, consult with tribal officials as to the need for Fed-
eral standards and any alternatives that would limit the
scope of Federal standards or otherwise preserve the
prerogatives and authority of Indian tribes.
195 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000).
196 47 U.S.C. §§154(i), 303(r) (2000).
197 See Statement of Policy, supra note 35.
198 See supra Part IV.
199 463 U.S. 110 (1983). This case involves the govern-
The Commission may be able to persuade a
court it has not violated its general duty to Indian
tribes by arguing that its duty to tribes is limited
by competing duties spelled out in the Communi-
cations Act. The FCC has a mandate to facilitate a
"rapid" and "efficient" national and global com-
munication system serving "all the people of the
United States."1 95 The Commission is empowered
to "perform any and all acts" to execute its func-
tions.' 96 The FCC's Statement of Policy highlights
this limitation when it states that its goal of work-
ing with tribes must be "consistent with Section 1
of the Communications Act of 1934."'' 11 7 Because
of unresolved interference issues, the Commission
continues to restrict UWB deployment.1'98 The
Commission can argue that these interference
concerns also pertain to tribal use of UWB. Not
only would there be a risk of interference off the
reservation, but there would be interference with
other technologies in use on the reservation.
Thus, to perform its general regulatory duties, the
FCC must balance its duty to Indian tribes against
the need to maintain universal restrictions on
UWB. In exercising this duty, the Commission
must determine that the need for uniform UWB
regulations outweighs tribal sovereignty.
There is substantial case law to support this ar-
gument. In Nevada v. United States, '19 the Supreme
Court concluded that an agency's duty to tribes is
limited when the agency has conflicting duties for
the general public.2 " Cases discussing whether an
agency has violated its specific duties to tribes
when implementing a general statute provide fur-
ment's attempt to undo an earlier settlement decree regard-
ing the distribution of water rights between a tribe (repre-
sented by the government) and an irrigation district (also
represented by the government). The Court held that res
judicata precluded the current attempt to seek additional
water rights for the Indians. Id.
20 Id. at 128.
Congress was requiring the Secretary of the Interior to
carry water on at least two shoulders when it delegated
to him both the responsibility for the supervision of the
Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation
projects in areas adjacent to reservation lands. But Con-
gress chose to do thus and it is simply unrealistic to sug-
gest that the Government may not perform its obligation
to represent Indian tribes in litigation when Congress
has obliged it to represent other interests as well. In this
regard, the Government cannot follow the fastidious
standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his
duties to his single beneficiary solely by representing po-
tentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's
consent. The Government does not 'compromise' its ob-
ligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to re-
present by the mere fact that it simultaneously performs
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ther support for this conclusion.401 For example,
in Skomish Indian Tribe v. FERC,202 a Tribe sought
to obtain a preliminary permit to develop a hydro-
power facility. The FERC denied the permit appli-
cation on the grounds that the tribal proposal
conflicted with the city's relicense application for
a hydropower facility. 2 3 The tribe argued that
FERC, by following its regulations that mandated
it deny the tribe's application, ignored its trust re-
sponsibility toward Indian tribes.2°14 The Ninth
Circuit noted that although FERC does have a fi-
duciary responsibility towards Indian tribes, the
responsibility must be exercised in the context of
the Federal Power Act ("FPA"). The court con-
cluded that the FERC does not have to afford
tribes "greater rights than they would otherwise
have under the FPA and its implementing regula-
tions."2 0 5 Because the Tribe's permit application
was barred by FERC regulations, the federal trust
responsibility did not compel its acceptance.
Tribes can respond to the conflicting obligation
argument in two ways. First, they may demonstrate
that there would be no interference off the reser-
vation because transmissions would be limited to
the reservation. Second, the FCC does not have a
duty to protect other people on the reservation
from interference. The Statement of Policy specifi-
cally establishes the duty to "Indian Tribes" and
"Tribal Governments;" 2" 6 not tribal members and
reservation residents.
Even if the scope of duty is not restricted by a
competing interest, a court is likely to conclude
another task for another interest that Congress has obli-
gated it by statute to do.
201 See Skomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303,
1308-09 (9th Cir. 1997).
FERC is "subject to the United States' fiduciary responsi-
bility towards Indian tribes, which, in essence consists of
acting in the interests of the tribes." Nevertheless, it ex-
ercises this responsibility in the context of the FPA.
Hence, FERC has previously rejected arguments that it
must afford Indian tribes greater rights than they would
otherwise have under the FPA and its implementing reg-
ulations. Here, the Tribe's permit application is barred
by FERC's regulations, and the federal trust responsibil-
ity does not compel its acceptance.
(internal citations omitted); Covelo Indian Cmty. v. FERC,
895 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that FERC did not
violate private fiduciary standards when it did not provide a
tribe with actual notice of a PG&E relicensing proceeding.).
202 121 F.3d at 1303 (9th Cir. 1997).
203 Id. at 1305.
204 1(. at 1308.
205 Id. at 1308-09.
206 Statement of Policy, supra note 35, at para. 3 ("In this
Statement of Policy, we refer to 'Indian Tribes' and 'Tribal
that restricting UWB use on tribal lands does not
violate the Commission's obligations. The univer-
sal service mandate in the Communications Act,
the legislative history of the Communications Act
and Commission regulations are primarily di-
rected toward facilitating tribal access to tele-
phone service-not wireless Internet or UWB.2 °7
Furthermore, the restrictions do not "significantly
or uniquely affect tribal governments, their land
and resources" or place an "undue burden" on
tribes.2"'8 There is evidence that the FCC's State-
ment of Policy2°9 has stimulated increased tribal ac-
cess to telecommunications. Finally, wired tech-
nologies can be used to ensure tribal access to the
Internet. UWB is not uniquely crucial to provid-
ing telecommunications services on tribal lands.
B. Administrative Action
Since litigation requires substantial resources
and is unlikely to succeed, tribes interested in us-
ing UWB technology should pursue administra-
tive relief. Specifically, tribes can file a petition
with the Commission seeking a waiver of the Com-
mission's Part 15 Rules. While promulgating rules
to extend wireless telecommunications services to
tribal lands, the Commission encouraged such pe-
titions. ) lO
There have been several published rulings on
petitions for waivers of rules on tribal lands. How-
ever, these cases involve telephone companies
seeking waivers of rules that restrict the purchase
Governments.").
207 See, e.g., Jennifer L. King, Increasing Telephone Penetra-
tion Rates and Promoting Economic Development on Tribal Lands:
A Proposal to Solve the Tribal and State Jurisdiction Problems, 53
FED. CoMm. LJ. 137, 13941 2000 (explaining that the 1996
Telecommunications Act and FCC actions are intended to in-
crease telephone penetration rates in tribal areas).
208 See Statement of Policy, supra note 35.
209 Id. In June 2000, the FCC adopted a policy statement
outlining its goals for tribal telecommunications.
210 Wireless Policy Order, supra. note 38, para. 39-41.
[W]e believe that parties should seek waivers of specific
rules or file other requests for regulatory relief in in-
stances where greater flexibility than the rules allow
would facilitate the provision of service to tribal lands.
We strongly encourage parties to file such requests
where needed, and delegate authority to the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau and the International Bu-
reau to consider these waivers as they apply to terrestrial
wireless and satellite-based services, respectively. Parties
seeking a waiver are encouraged to provide evidence of
an agreement with tribal authorities that includes a com-
mitment to serve the tribal lands.
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of service territory211 or support available tinder
universal service provisions, 2 12 not wireless com-
panies seeking waivers of restrictions on certain
types of technology. In general, Commission rules
may be waived for "good cause shown," which is
demonstrated if (1) special circumstances warrant
a deviation from the general rule, and (2) such a
deviation will serve the public interest.2" 3
1. Do "Special Circumstances" Warrant a Deviation
From the General Rule?
A lack of advanced telecommunications services
on the tribe constitutes "special circumstances"
warranting a deviation from the general rule. In
ruling on Mescalero Apache Telecom's petition,
the Commission found "special circumstances"
existed where (1) the percentage of residences on
the Reservation without telephone service was sig-
nificantly greater than the national average;2 1 4 (2)
211 These rulings turn on the FCC's willingness to waive
the typically applied definition of "study area."
A study area is a geographic segment of an incumbent
local exchange carrier's (LEC's) telephone operations.
Generally, a study area corresponds to an incumbent
LEC's entire service territory within a state. The Com-
mission froze all study area boundaries effective Novem-
ber 15, 1984 and an incumbent LEG must apply to the
Commission for a waiver of the study area boundary
freeze if it wishes to sell or purchase additional ex-
changes.
In. re Mesalero Apache Telecom, Inc., Joint Petition For Waiver of
the Definition of "Study Area" Contained in the Part 36,
Waiver of Sections 61.41(c)(2), 69.3(e)(11), 36.611, and
36.612 of the Commission's Rules, Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 3813
para. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Mescalero 1]; In re ATEAC, Inc.,
Petition For Waiver of the Definition of "Study Area" Con-
tained in the Part 36, Appendix-Glossary of the Commission's
Rules, Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 849 para. 2 (2001) [hereinafter
ATEA C].
212 See, e.g., Mescalero 1, 16 FCC Rcd. 3813 at paras. 11-21
(discussing petition for (1) waiver of price cap rules under
Section 61.41 (c) (2); and (2) waiver of Section 69.3(e)(11)
stating that "any change in NECA carrier common line tariff
participation and long term support (LTS) resulting from a
merger of acquisition of telephone properties is effective on
the next annual access tariff filing date" following the merger
or acquisition.); In re Mescalero Apache Telecom, Inc.:
Waiver of Section 54.305 of the Commission's Rules, Order,
16 FCC Rcd. 1312 at para. 3 (2001) (discussing the waiver of
Section 54.305 of the Commission's rules, which provide
"that a carrier acquiring exchanges from an unaffiliated car-
rier shall receive the same per-line levels of high-cost univer-
sal service support for which the acquired exchanges were
eligible prior to their transfer.") [hereinafter Mescalero II]; In
re San Carlos Apache Telecommunication Utility, Inc.: Peti-
tion for Waiver of Sections 36.611 and 36.612 of the Commis-
sion's Rules, Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 15055 (2001) (discussing the
waiver of Sections 36.611 and 36.612, which would enable
San Carlos to receive accelerated high-cost loop support pay-
the carrier was tribally owned;21 5 and (3) the high
costs faced by Mescalero as a tribally-owned start-
up company were "unusually severe." 2 16 In an-
other ruling, the Commission held that no special
circumstances existed because the telephone pen-
etration rate on the reservation was approximately
80 to 85 percent." 17 Thus, assuming the tribes
have an undeveloped telecommunications infra-
structure, they should be able to prove that "spe-
cial circumstances" exist.
2. Would Deviation From the General Rule Serve the
Public Interest?
The Commission holds that it is in the public
interest to waive a rule when (1) it is consistent
with tribal policy2 18 and (2) the waiver would have
a minimal effect on policy goals.219
The Commission may decide that, in spite of
the risk of interference, it would be in the public
ments) [hereinafter San Carlos Order]; In re of Federal State
Board on Universal Service (CC Docket No. 96-45), (Dec. 23,
1999) (discussing waiver of Section 54.403 (a), which requires
state commission action before carriers can receive federal
Lifeline support reimbursements).
21-1 Mescalero 11, supra note 212, at para. 8.
214 The percentage of residences on the Reservation
without telephone service was 52 percent. The national aver-
age penetration level for all households in the United States
is 94.6 percent. See id. at para. 7.
215 Id. at para. 8.
216 Id. at para. 9.
217 San Carlos Order, supra note 212, at para. 11.
218 See Mescalero I, supra note 211, at paras. 28-29 (hold-
ing that waiver of Sections 36.611 and 36.612 would be in the
public interest, because a waiver would be consistent with the
Universal Service mandate and consistent with the trust rela-
tionship); see also Mescalero II, supra note 212, at para. 11 ("We
find that this result is consistent with our obligations under
the historic federal trust relationship between the federal
government and federally-recognized Indian tribes to en-
courage tribal sovereignty and sel-governance and to ensure
a standard of livability for members of Indian tribes on tribal
lands.").
219 See Mescalero I, supra note 211, at para. 18 (holding
that the public interest would be served by a waiver of price
cap rules, because the circumstances surrounding Mes-
calero's acquisition of Valor's access lines fail to give rise to
the dangers of cost-shifting and gaming of the system.); see
also Mescalero II, supra note 212, at para. 11.
We further note that waiver of section 54.305 in this in-
stance will have minimal effect on the high-cost univer-
sal service mechanisms. We estimate that the additional
support received by Mescalero as a result of this waiver
will result in an annual aggregate shift that is less than
one percent of any of the high-cost universal service
mechanisms. This is consistent with the Commission's
prior analysis of whether a transfer of exchanges has an
adverse impact on the universal service support mecha-
nisms.
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interest to waive restrictions on the deployment of
UWB-based outdoor communication systems on
tribal lands. First, tribes can argue that there will
be no interference. Since the tribes are geograph-
ically isolated and have no existing wireless capa-
bilities, there would be little risk of emissions
outside the reservation and no other wireless sig-
nals exist to interfere with UWB transmission on
the reservation. Second, tribes can argue that a
waiver would serve the public interest by promot-
ing tribal sovereignty. 2 1 Third, a waiver would
serve the public interest and be consistent with
the Commission's duties expressed in its Statement
of Policy, Commission regulations, the Communi-
cations Act and the federal trust doctrine.2 2'
Lastly, the project would further the public inter-
est, because the reservation could serve as a "test-
ing ground" for UWB telecommunications net-
works. 222
While it is uncertain how the Commission
would rule, there is a higher likelihood of tribes
obtaining permission for the use of UWB-based
outdoor communication systems though the ad-
ministrative process at the Commission rather
220 See Statement of Policy, supra note 35.
221 See Legal Tools for Tribes to Obtain UWB-Based Out-
door Communications Systems, Part VI, supra, for a thorough
discussion of how allowing UWB deployment on Tribal lands
would meet the Commissions' responsibilities under the
Statement of Policy, regulations, the Telecommunications Act
and federal trust doctrine.
222 Uncertainty surrounding the interference issue has
than through litigation in the courts. Further-
more, the costs of filing a petition for waiver with
the FCC pale in comparison to the costs of litiga-
tion. Tribes should concentrate their resources
on gaining administrative approval for the use of
UWB telecommunications networks on tribal
lands.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because UWB technology is the most promising
technological solution to the tribal telecommuni-
cation crisis, tribal lawyers should analyze legal
tools available to enable deployment of UWB-
based communication systems. In addition to ben-
efiting tribes, a successful tribal U WB telecommu-
nications network may prompt the FCC to relax
its UWB regulations for all users. However, as this
article has demonstrated, litigation strategies are
complex, time-consuming and ultimately unlikely
to succeed. Therefore, UWB proponents should
focus their resources on petitioning the FCC to
waive their UWB restrictions on tribal lands.
created a significant regulatory dilemma for the Commission.
Assuming the project would involve testing of interference,
the results of the project could save the Commission a great
deal of time and resources. Moreover, the project could re-
sult in the deregulation of a technology that has substantial
benefits and minimal risks. See generally, Statement of Policy,
supra note 35.
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